


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
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
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THE IDEA OF GOD

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING

THE PRACTICAL CONTENT OF THE ONTOLOGICAL
PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

AND THE

RELATION OF THE IDEA OF THE OBJECT OF RELIGION TO
CONSCIOUS RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, IN THE LIGHT
OF MODERN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DOCTORATE IN PHILOSOPHY

BY

JAMES PALMER.

NEW YORK

1904

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE PROBLEM AND ITS RELATIONS: Religion Differentiated from Speculative Thought. — Speculative Perversion of the Ontological Proof. — Related to Religious Experience. — Anselm's Identification of the Idea of a most Perfect Being with the God of Religion. — Analysis of Consciousness. — Internal Factors. — The Expression of the Religious Emotions. — The Emotions and their Roots. The Work of Consciousness. The Idea. Its Purpose. — The three Factors of Consciousness. — The Historic Development of Religions. — The Construction of Proofs. — Outline of Discussion.....	1-9
---	-----

PART I.

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF AND EPISTEMOLOGY.

CHAPTER I. HISTORICAL SURVEY: Augustine on Truth. — Anselm's Discovery. — Emotions Described. — Key to the Argument. — Descartes' Appeal to Causality. — Leibnitz, the Principle of Non-contradiction. — Attitude of Different Schools of Philosophy. Kant's Criticism.....	10-14
CHAPTER II. CONCEPT AND BEING: Anselm's Apparent <i>per Sal- tum</i> . — Royce's Analysis of the Concepts of Being. — Realism, Mysticism, Critical Rationalism and Idealism Defined. — Realism, Monistic and Pluralistic, Spinoza. — Locke and Hume. — Mysticism. — Critical Rationalism, Kant, Transcendental Idealism Combined with Empirical Realism. — Isolating Single Faculties. — Phenomena and Things-in-themselves. — The Concept of Validity. Kant's Criticism of the <i>a priori</i> Proof. Value of Kant's Work. — Idealism. The Analysis of Consciousness. — Relation of Idea and Object. Purpose of the Idea a Quest for its Other. — Idealism and the Ontological Proof.....	14-23

PART II.

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF AND PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

CHAPTER I. THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO PSYCHOLOGY: The Spheres of Religion and Psychology. — Religion has a Psychology. — Description of Experience. — An Ulterior Value of the Ontological Proof. — Descartes' Discovery. Psychology Separated from Religion. — Efforts to Function Religion.....24-28

CHAPTER II. RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: Kant's Criticism. — Anselm and Augustine. — The God-idea and Religious Emotion. — The Ontological Proof Directs to Introspection. — Descartes. — Religious Emotions Facts. — Finiteness and Limitation. — Rational and Material Self Distinguished in Consciousness. — Religion Involves all Faculties. — A Primary Religious Emotion. — Development of this Emotion. — Relation of Ontological Idea to. — The Infinite, Max Müller. — Shamanism and Divination. — Relation of Animism. — Its Support to our Theory. — Material and Mental Fields for Theogonic Material. — Development of Pantheism. It is a Philosophy. — Illustration from Religion of Romans. — Higher Forms of Religious Experience. Metanoia. — The Testimony of Psychology. — Worship. — Development of Saintliness. — Corrective Influence of Psychology. — Religious Experience a Part of the Totality of Experience.....28-43

CHAPTER III. EXPERIENCE AS KNOWLEDGE: Credo ut Intellegam. — A Corrective to Mysticism. — Historic Revelation. — Enthusiasm. — Methods of Dreams, Intoxications, Trance. — Psychology's Treatment. — The Subconscious. — Tests of Enthusiasm, Truth and Value. — The Founder of Christianity. — Mysticism. — Buddhism. — Social Self Consciousness. — The Unfolding of the God-idea.....43-52

PART III.

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF AND ETHICS.

CHAPTER I. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES: Conflict of Theories. — Ethics Related to Religion. — Problem of Ethics. — Purpose in Act and Idea. — Meaning of Purpose and Idea. — Science of Ethics. — Light from Anthropology. — Development of Ethics along

with Religion. — Limit to Ethical Force of Nature Religion, Fatalism. — The Fields of Religion and Ethics. — Light from Psychology. — Hume. — Functioning of Ethics. — Psycho- logical Analysis of Conduct. — Failure of Hedonism. — Of Institutionalism. — The Norms of Ethics, that Discovered by Religion	53-68
CHAPTER II. THE ONTOLOGICAL METHOD OF ETHICS: Our Atti- tude toward Metaphysics. — The Reality of Things, Ideas and Events. — Kant's Ethical Theory. — The Good Will, the Moral Law, Conception of Duty. — Origin of Moral Conceptions, Autonomy and Heteronomy. — The Radical Evil, Restoration. — Relation of our Theory to Kant's. — Criticism of Kant. — Autonomy in Saint Paul's Conception of His Relation to God. — "Is the Good Good because God Wills it?" — Calvinistic De- terminism. — Our Agreement with Kant Concerning Autonomy and Heteronomy. — Service of the Ontological Proof.....	63-69
CONCLUSION: The Ontological Proof a Guiding Principle. — Re- ligion the Tangible Proof.....	69-70

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INTRODUCTION.

THE PROBLEM AND ITS RELATIONS.

Religion.—The differentiation of Religion from speculative thought took place in a process of historical development. To Schleiermacher belongs the distinction of being the first to point out that Religion has a sphere peculiarly its own. Speculative religious thought may take the form of Animism, Pantheism, Deism or Theism; it may be dogmatical, skeptical or even atheistic, but in these ranges it diverges from Religion and is metaphysical rather than practical. It was to guard against the waste of energy in such dialectical performances that Kant thought out and gave to the world his Critique of Pure Reason. The "police duty," however, which he thought this work would serve, has not been and never can be successful. If life had no personal concern in the Object of pure reason's research, the human mind could well abandon its quest, settle down quietly to the humdrum of a routine life and content itself with empirical verities. This however is not the case. Religion is a vitally personal topic; and, as an ever present experience, it keeps reason in touch with the Object of speculative inquiry on the practical side. Kant himself was aware of this fact and sought to develop it in the Critique of the Practical Reason but the relation is too manifold to be summed up in a Categorical Imperative.

Speculative Religion.—It is the intention of this thesis to direct attention to the relation of the *a priori* proof of the existence of God, as it was formulated by Anselm, to Religion, as opposed to or different from, speculative religious thought. The Ontological Proof as a proof has been abundantly treated. It would take the space usually allotted to a monograph to sufficiently catalogue the discussion it has occasioned. But in all of this treatment by lead-

ers of thought and men of less ability the argument has been given a speculative turn and the practical content, which is a matter of permanent value, has been overlooked. One needs only to turn to some books on Theism or treatises on Dogmatic Theology to verify the truth of this statement. It will be discovered there, that the discussion turns on necessary existence, perfection of being, existence as a part of the concept of a perfect being, causality, etc. Descartes was the first thus to use and abuse Anselm's discovery. By so doing he rescued this form of proof from its obscurity but at the same time diverted it from Religion to Philosophy. Leibnitz, Spinoza and Herbert of Cherbury agreed in following Descartes in this perversion. It thus entered into Theism, Deism, and Pantheism. And it was against these speculative forms of the argument that Kant hurled his powerful criticism.

The position here taken in the face of this speculative use of the Proof is that Anselm discovered the argument in devout meditation, that it is inseparably linked, even in its speculative parts, with religious experience, and, that it has a perennial force as an expression of the religious consciousness of mankind. And, while it may be true that only a few gifted minds grasp the significance of the words in which Anselm repeatedly expressed himself, nevertheless, the Ontological Idea has ever been a constitutive principle in the development of historic religions. Since the days of Anselm many new fields of knowledge have been explored, titanic efforts have been made to formulate a satisfactory theory of knowledge, the science of psychology has rendered definite service to the examination of all experimental phenomena, and anthropology has introduced new facts for the science of religion. The fruits of the labor in all these fields will be found to be of distinct service in our examination of the subject before us. With these preliminary remarks we will now enter upon the task of stating the Problem and its Relations.

Consciousness is the inner mystery of experience. The thought world stands on one side and the world of things stands over against it. Consciousness, in between, is the transformation point. When Religion turns to consciousness for a verification

of its facts, it has made its appeal to the highest court of human decisions. In its inception, preservation and continuation Religion is always related to conscious experience. The problem arises when religious experience relates itself to an Object. This is not remarkable since a problem always arises when reason attempts to show the relation of any idea to its object. There is a heterogeneousness of object and idea which consciousness alone serves to link together. It was this apparent chasm between the idea and its object which Anselm overleaped when he said: "Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo majus cogitari non potest, et nec cogitari possit non esse: et hoc es Tu, Domine Deus noster."¹ The transition from the "aliquid quo majus cogitari non potest" to the "hoc es Tu" constitutes the great problem of epistemology, and the reasoning by which this apparent *per saltum* was removed formed the Ontological argument in its most complete statement. It runs as follows: "Et certe id, quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. . . . Existet ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et intellectu et in re."² The argument itself is not what chiefly concerns us. From our point of view we are most interested to observe the conscious effort which the argument expresses to pass from what is "*in solo intellectu*" to an "*esse in intellectu et in re*" or the "*Hoc es Tu*" of experience. We perceive in this effort an expression of the fact that consciousness in religious experience as in other experience recognizes internal facts with both internal and external meanings.

So long as attention is restricted to the internal facts, Religion is a psychic state in which feeling and need, fear and hope, enthusiasm and submission play a great part.³ Nevertheless these experiences are not without ideas which constitute a relation between the conscious self and all that is beyond. For this reason while all consciousness is unquestionably internal, a purely inter-

¹ Anselm, "Proslogion 2."

² Anselm, "Proslogium II Opera," Minge ed.

³ Höffding, "Religions-philosophie," I.

nal Religion is excluded from the realm of possibility. Again these psychic states are composed of emotions which tend to express themselves either physically or intellectually. This brings Religion to the surface of life if it does not extend it further. It is the expression of the religious emotions rather than the emotions themselves and their roots which occupy a large part of the attention of students who devote themselves to the study of Religion. The books on Religion and the customs of Religion are full of them. The attitudes, forms and symbols of worship are either external representations of internal states or the imitation of persons in whom such states are a reality. The same emotions under differing conditions may find expression in music, in poetry, in artistic symbolism or in a creed, each of which represents life's reaction upon its own conscious experiences. And last of all and best of all the most perfect expression of the religious emotions is to be seen in a life, so ordered, that the inner experiences are brought into harmony with the Universal Will. This I would call the ethical expression of the religious emotions.

The fact is to be noted, in this connection, that it is the nature of the religious emotions to express themselves and that it is within the sphere of consciousness, when attention is directed thereto, not only to be aware of the outward facts of experience, but also, to know the emotions themselves from which these facts arise. It is also to be observed that the same emotions such as fear, faith and love which compel certain physical attitudes will, under changed conditions, constrain to ethical conduct. In this truth the hope of culture is enshrined. The dynamic is given. It is simply a question of how a present energy is to be directed. The power lies back of the emotions.

It is when we turn our attention to these emotions themselves and their roots that we meet with the Problem which the Ontological Proof thrusts upon us. Here is a force which is known in consciousness which produces something in a matter of fact world. How can we get at it? First of all it is to be asserted that consciousness is that function of intelligence whereby facts and ideas are combined. There is no consciousness without both

of these elements and, in the case in hand, emotions would be simple facts or events which consciousness could not grasp if they were not linked inseparably with their corresponding ideas. Fear, faith and love are nothing without an object, however ideal that object may be. And it is the idea of an object, linked with them which constitutes them conscious emotions. This idea which the understanding involves with these simple emotions is the object or Other of which they are correlates. We are, therefore, in experience never conscious of a pure emotion alone, or of an object alone, but of an emotion combined with the idea of an object. Thus in the Ontological Argument the emotion expressed in the words "*Hoc es Tu*" is not pure ecstasy but ecstasy combined with the idea of an object whose best description is "*id quo majus cogitari nequit*."

So much then for consciousness. It reveals in an experience, a fact, that is, in the present case, an emotion and also an idea which represents, in the case under consideration, an Other—"than which a greater cannot be conceived." Our entire theory depends on these two factors of consciousness. Neither can be taken up or abandoned without the other. The reality of the emotions is part and parcel with the reality of self. The idea, on the other hand, without which the emotions amount to zero so far as consciousness is concerned is the counterpart of the Other of the universe to which the self is related in various ways. In fact the relationship is so manifold that an infinite variety of objects and events is involved in the development of Religion. But since the individual self, as known in consciousness, makes use of an understanding, subject to the forms of thought, its relation to the Other must be an historical relation, in so much as the relation of every idea to its object is successive and therefore historical.

Idea.—The next step after observing this inseparable union of emotion and idea in a living consciousness is to make a further analysis of our concept of an idea. The division of ideas according to their simplicity or complexity must ever be a relative division since the simplest idea is both sensory and motor, cog-

nitive and conative. Neither does the Cartesian notion of *vividness* nor the Spinozistic determination of *adequacy* help us. Hume was nearer to our point of view when he spoke of the *force* and *liveliness* of ideas. Professor Royce in his Gifford lectures on the World and the Individual says: "An idea is any state of mind that has a conscious meaning." In another place he says: "Your intelligent ideas of things never consist in mere images of those things, but always involve a purpose of how you intend to act toward the things of which you have ideas." This use of the term he abundantly defends and makes the basis of his theory of knowledge. An idea without a purpose, an intention, a meaning is as little an idea as the image in a mirror.

Holding fast then to this definition of an idea and returning to what we have already observed in consciousness we are prepared to assert that a state of consciousness containing an emotion with its idea involves the three possible psychical factors — feeling, knowing and willing. In other words the act of consciousness involves the entire personality. And the fact that a religious consciousness has for its content an emotion directed to or awakened by a Supernatural Being does not isolate it from these psychical conditions. Thus our analysis has supplied us with a guiding principal whose significance will appear as the discussion proceeds; for we find that speculative religious thought is ever tending to connect itself with one or other mental faculty and thus present an abnormal development. Deism and theistic systems are predominantly intellectual. Schleiermacher and the mystics give too much prominence to the emotions or feelings. And Kant followed by Schopenhauer and von Hartmann has given undue prominence to the will. The only corrective for such one sidedness is a return to the religious consciousness. And it is the Ontological proof alone, as an expression of the religious consciousness, which gives due emphasis to the internal and external meanings of the religious life.

Public Religion. — Thus far, we have not gone beyond, the personal and private limits of religious experience. We have been concerned with it as a psychological and internal affair. It is clear,

however, that the expression of the religious emotions must be external, and, to a certain extent, public. It is also evident that the religious idea, in going beyond self to find its Other, must also discover new relationships in a world or universe. The mind accepts what it finds and reacts upon it, but, in so doing, it gives up its private character and recognizes self as one of many. The world is discovered to be full of things and events which either help or hinder the religious life in its progress.

Historical Development of Religions. — If our account, up to this point is accepted as a true analysis of the content of a religious consciousness, we need have no difficulty in accounting for the historic development of religions. In a very general description these may be grouped under three heads, as follows : (1) Fetishism and Animism, (2) Polytheism and Pantheism, (3) Henotheism and Theism. These groups each combine practical and theoretical elements. In each of them a religious emotion, combined with its idea, is found seeking its object or Other ; and the Religion is named according to the object seized upon. Taking the first group first, one can easily understand, how the mind of the primitive nature worshiper, not satisfied with the limited nature of his fetish, would seek to satisfy his idea, by increasing the number of his fetishes and philosophizing concerning their occult powers. Thus animism, which spiritualizes the objects of worship, would form a kind of philosophy of fetishism. In fact, Tiele takes the position, that no Religion is to be found, in which this process has not taken place. From this position, the transition is not great, after the mind has discovered that single objects of worship whether small or great however multiplied and idealized are not sufficient to satisfy the purpose of its idea, the transition is not great, I say, from Polytheism to Pantheism. It is readily seen, if we follow this line of thought, that Monotheism is not possible for any other than a spiritual Religion. Any or all material objects could not fulfill the Ontological Idea. The mind is constantly asserting its superiority to material things ; how then, could it indefinitely look to them as masters ? “By an instinct earlier than any history can trace man sets the power in and behind

phenomena on his side.”¹ This is reason’s reaction upon experience. We may expect, therefore, and the facts of anthropology do not disappoint our expectations, that we shall find in Religion certain internal emotions with their ideas and a constant effort on the part of the intellect to adjust the rest of experience to harmonize with these ideas. It is the effort to adjust the rest of experience which gives rise to the theoretical elements of Religion and causes it to halt in halfway places. A Theodicy is needed at almost every turn of life.

Construction of Proofs.—The events which call for a Theodicy also point to Atheism as a possibility. This fact may have given an impulse to the construction of proofs, which does not begin until a late stage has been reached in the development of religious thought. The basis of the proofs is found, either, in the nature of the universe, yielding the Cosmological and Teleological arguments, the nature of the soul, giving the Psycho-physical proof, or the the nature of Being leading to the Ontological idea. Our interest in this latter form of proof arises, from its internal and immediate nature, and the fact that it directs attention inward, thus preparing the way for the discovery of consciousness with its contents. We also find that “it expresses that impulse which we experience toward the supersensuous, and that faith in its truth which is the starting point of all religion.”² This impulse toward the supersensuous is such a practical element of life that it puts the mind always on the alert to verify its experiences, and, whatever other things experience may discover in the world of facts, reason continues its search for the Object of Religion.

In the following chapters some attention will be paid to the Theories of Knowledge which recognize the chasm between thought and things; and, it will also be necessary to inquire further concerning the nature of ideas and their relation to Reality. In this connection the speculative religious ideas which have grown up in connection with various concepts of being will serve as illustrations of our theme. In the second part the Psychology

¹ Wallace, “Gifford Lectures,” p. 193.

² Lotze, “Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion,” p. 12.

of the Religious Emotions will be drawn upon to support that part of the proof which connects with experience. And a third part will indicate the relation of the Ontological Idea to action and show the bearing of the entire discussion upon the Problem of Conduct and Life.

PART I.

THE IDEA OF GOD AND EPISTEMOLOGY.

I.

HISTORICAL SURVEY.

A brief historical sketch will be useful, in setting our topic in its connection with other methods of knowledge. The analysis of consciousness, in the preceding chapter, revealed the subjects to which an *a priori* proof stands related. The idea must be supported by a theory of knowledge, the emotion demands a psychological support and the intention of the idea belongs to a theory of motives or ethics. Let us see, now, what the actual fate of the argument has been.

When Augustine said: "There must be a truth. For if you deny there is a truth, you affirm there is no truth; and thus you contradict yourself. The sum total of truth, conceived as a unity, is, however, the very essence of God," he was evidently preparing the way for Anselm's discovery. The preparation, however, was purely in method, not in substance. Augustine might be called the father of the introspective method. It was he who first forced doubt to pay tribute to certainty. And, by directing attention to the immediacy of consciousness, he furnished a method which, in the hands of Anselm and Descartes, prepared the way for valuable discoveries.

The relation of the Ontological Proof to consciousness is made very clear in the preface to the *Proslogion*.¹ There the author declares: "I began to inquire whether it might not be possible to find in a single argument, which being complete in itself, would

¹ Anselm, "*Proslogion* Preface," translated by Maginnis, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1851.

need the aid of no other for its confirmation, and which alone would suffice to prove that there is indeed a God, that He is the supreme good and that He is in need of nothing — an argument sufficient to prove all that we are accustomed to believe concerning the Divine nature. . . . But when I endeavored to banish this thought entirely, lest, by occupying my mind in fruitless search, it might detain me from my other studies in which I might make some useful progress, then it began to press itself upon me the more with a kind of importunity. In the very conflict of my thought, that presented itself to me which I had despaired of finding.”

The point of interest in this rather long quotation is the likeness it shows to what might be found in the expression of any scientific consciousness. The same restlessness and sense of compulsion is apparent which frequently anticipates discovery. It is true that Anselm¹ himself regarded his discovery as an “illumination.” He said: “Thanks be unto Thee, O Lord, thanks be unto Thee, that which I at first *believed* through thine own endowment, I now *understand* through thine illumination, even were I unwilling to believe that Thou art, I cannot remain ignorant of thine existence.” We are not concerned, however, with his interpretation of his experience. The term religious consciousness was unknown to him and belongs to a more fully developed psychology. But his description of his inner experience is exceedingly interesting. It shows that to him at least the Proof had an emotional and religious as well as a logical significance.

Without repeating the argument as stated in the Proslogion and expounded in the reply to Gaunilo, let us note that the judgment “*existet ergo . . . in re*,” is analytic. In other words existence is a part of the content of the concept of the most perfect being. This statement is not introduced here for the sake of discussion, disputed as it is, but as a point of contrast in making the transition from Anselm to Descartes. For while it is true that Descartes asserts:² “That we may validly infer the existence of God

¹ Anselm, “Proslogion,” C. 2, end.

² Descartes, “Principles of Philosophy,” trans. by J. Vietch, p. 199.

from necessary existence being comprised in the concept we have of Him," he still regards it as an inference and proceeds to follow the clue of causality. He says :¹ "The greater objective perfection there is in our idea of a thing the greater also must be the perfection of its cause." The bald realism of the cartesian dualism here begins to shine through. In the third Meditation, also, after stating what the idea of God includes, he adds :² "The more attentively I consider them the less I feel persuaded that the idea I have of them owes its origin to myself alone." Thus in Descartes' hands the Ontological Proof began to assume an *a posteriori* character.

This fact is the more remarkable when we consider the Cartesian method. He was the philosopher *par excellans* of consciousness. In this he may have been guided by Anselm and Augustine but the important fact is "that he reached by way of doubt the principle of self consciousness and made it the starting point of his system."³ The value of this principle we will have occasion to note later in this connection ; we may simply remark here that it at first lent itself to Rational Psychology rather than Religion. It was Descartes, then, who began the preparation for the study of the psychological relations of religion, who, also, perverted the Ontological Proof to the channel of Speculative Religious thought.

The three philosophers who directly succeeded Descartes were Locke, Spinoza and Leibnitz, the great representatives of empiricism, Pantheism and individualism. Locke gave up the Ontological Proof along with innate ideas, Spinoza turned it to the service of speculative Pantheism, and Leibnitz alone made any useful contribution to it. He said :⁴ "It proves that assuming that God is possible He exists." In other words he introduced the principle of non-contradiction. "Being," according to Leibnitz,⁵ "is that the concept of which, involves something positive, or that which can by us be conceived, provided that which we conceive is

¹ Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy," trans. by J. Vietch, Sec. XVII.

² Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy," p. 125.

³ Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy." Introduction, p. 24.

⁴ Leibnitz, "New Essays," Bk. 4, ch. 10, p. 540.

⁵ Leibnitz, "New Essays," Bk. 4, ch. 10, p. 717.

possible." Most important of all he worked out the demonstration according to the principle of non-contradiction that the concept of God is possible and concludes that the *a priori* proof of his existence is valid.¹

The argument, with the names most closely identified with it, is now before us. Its requirements have not been satisfactorily fulfilled. This is all that an historical survey needs to show. One or two further facts, however, are of interest. In the first place a long list of celebrated names could be arrayed in favor of the cogency of this form of proof. They have accepted it in the interest of speculative inquiry either Theistic, Deistic or Pantheistic. On the other hand Empiricists and the transcendental Idealists have consistently rejected it. In a general way it might be considered as acceptable to theologians and worthless to scientists. Our position is that neither dogmatism nor scepticism has grasped its full significance as an expression of the religious consciousness. Its original relation to practical religious experience has been forgotten. This is especially apparent in Kant's criticism. He included the Ontological Proof along with the Cosmological and Psychophysical arguments under the Transcendental Dialectic. They are exercises of pure reason. Having performed this feat by what he had well named Transcendental Topic, he had rendered all alike sufficiently fruitless. Nevertheless by a method precisely similar to that followed by Anselm although infinitely narrower, he arrived at an Ontological proof of the existence of God, by way of the Practical Reason. Paulsen, in his recent life of Kant says:² "Whoever ascribes absolute intelligible reality and unity to the intelligible world, naturally cannot deny the Ontological proof of the existence of God." Kant's criticism applies to the proof, therefore, only in its speculative and not in its practical capacity. Yet, the weight of Kant's influence in the last half of the nineteenth century no doubt, did much to cause the Ontological Proof to be abandoned as a support of Speculative Theism.

¹ Erdmann, "Lib. Op. Philos.," pp. 443-445.

² Paulsen, "Life of Kant," p. 223.

On the other hand the progress of the psychological and anthropological study of religion together with the observations of consciousness and the processes of religious development are forcing a return to this method of proof. Mr. A. E. Taylor claims¹ that "the religious experience in its permanent essence is an inseparable element in a comprehensive human experience of the world" and "in the sense that the claims of religion to represent an integral element in a full human experience of the world is justified by the facts of life, the 'Ontological Proof' seems valid and irrefragible."

Our Problem now is before us with a sufficient outline of its historical connections. It is high time to address ourselves to the task we have outlined. The first part of the undertaking must be to find a self-consistent concept of being. The way at this point has been prepared for us by Professor Royce in his analysis of the four historic concepts of being and we will thankfully accept his assistance.²

II.

CONCEPT AND BEING.

Common sense perceives a difference between thought and things. The impression and the object which gives the impression, the idea and the ideate, what Anselm meant by "esse in intellectu" and "esse in re" or whatever terms may be used to express the difference, it is sufficiently determined. It was this difference which Anselm appeared to disregard when he passed from the "id quo majus, etc.," of his thought to the "Hoc es Tu" of his experience. The question arises — how is this procedure to be justified? How can an object discovered by the mind ever be recognized as identical with an object known by experience? The answer to this question is far from being easy, it constitutes the essential difference between Realism and Mysticism, Critical Rationalism and Idealism. It may be well at the beginning of our discus-

¹ A. E. Taylor, "The Problem of Conduct," pp. 443-444.

² Royce, "The World and the Individual," Vol. I.

sion to set before ourselves briefly the meaning of these four theories of Being as Professor Royce has defined them.

1. Realism asserts that Being is independent of ideas.

2. Mysticism defines Being as an absolute and simple unity which quenches thought through the presence of a single and absolutely immediate truth. It is a theory of the immediacy of true knowledge. It identifies Being with the true meaning of ideas.

3. Critical Rationalism is an attempt to identify the validity of the idea with the true being of the fact defined by the idea.

4. Idealism affirms that "Reality is a will concretely embodied in a life." "The object according to this theory is only the completely embodied will of the idea." What is, presents the fulfillment of the whole purpose of the very idea that now seeks Reality.¹

Realism. — With these definitions to guide us let us begin our examination of the various theories of knowledge which attempt to answer our question. Realism is the first to demand attention. It takes either the form of monism or pluralism. As an example of monistic Realism we may turn to Spinoza. He represents reality as one substance with its two attributes, thought and extension. Now hear what he has to say :² "So long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature . . . through the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the whole of nature through the attribute of extension only." Thus thought and extension follow two parallel lines which meet only in infinity. The question then arises — "How can any one be sure that he has ideas which agree with their objects?"³ To this question he replies : "Truth is its own standard." The real answer, however, is the very substance of Pantheism : "Our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God ; therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God."

¹ Royce, "The World and the Individual," I, pp. 143, 227, 355, 359.

² Spinoza, "Ethics," Part II, Prop. VII, note.

³ Spinoza, "Ethics," Part II, Prop. 43, note.

In other words, God serves the purpose of a clearing house of ideas. This thought permeates Spinoza's discussion of the nature and origin of the mind. But it is scarcely necessary to say that we would search in vain in our consciousness to find anything which would correspond with this purely speculative theory of knowledge.

The pluralistic branch of Realism is represented by the Empirical School of thought. Certain matters of fact are assumed and ideas are derived from them in the course of experience. According to Locke: "The understanding does not have the least glimmering of any idea which it doth not receive from sensation or reflection."¹ This renders the concept dependent upon the object. Hume, however, says with regard to the impressions received by the senses: "It will always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the Author of our being."² And in the chapter on the Idea of Existence he adds: "We never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can perceive any kind of existence but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass." These then are the limits of Empiricism, Locke deriving all ideas from sensations and reflection and Hume shutting up all experience to perceptions.

There is no hope then of finding an answer to our question either in Monistic or Pluralistic Realism. Thought and things stand independent of each other. As we have already seen the monistic answer is given at the expense of Pantheism. The Religion of empiricism is even worse. It banished the idea of God to the realm of pure reason where it survived as a form of metaphysical speculation. Locke and Hume both gave up the Ontological Proof, the one embracing a Cosmological or Teleological argument and the other abandoning all proofs. Religion under these circumstances lost its experimental significance and became an affair of Reason. Locke's Epistemology was necessarily fatal

¹ Locke, "Essay on the Human Understanding," p. 84.

² Hume, "Treatise of Human Nature."

to Natural Religion which rested upon a theory of innate ideas and Hume's Scepticism was subversive of all Religion.

Such a theory is not only destructive for Religion ; it would destroy the entire unity of the universe itself. If an idea and an object are entirely independent entities they can and must exist each without the other else their independence is an illusion. "They have nothing in common," says Royce, "neither quality nor worth, neither form nor content, neither truth nor meaning. No causality links them." And if this is true of the relation of concept and reality in a sensible world it must be equally true of an intelligible world. Concept and reality cannot exist in independence.

Mysticism.—If the facts of life in any way justified the theory of Mysticism it would not be necessary to continue our investigations further. The immediate intuition of Reality would refute all gainsaying. Such a theory, however, is out of harmony with both history and experience. Try as man does, he so far has not been able to cease either his fragmentary method of perception or "his deadly doing." We have to take life as it is and the great task is to make it what we would like it to be. The Ontological Argument, therefore, acts as a corrective to Mysticism in that it shows due regard for experience and God's revelation of himself to man in the progress of history. The short way from concept to Being by means of intuition has not, so far, been successfully traveled.

Critical Rationalism.—The discriminating intellect of Kant perceived the strength and weakness of Realism ; he, therefore, sought to escape the difficulty by weaving together Empirical Realism with Transcendental Idealism. This combination renders his system that much harder to understand. In the very beginning of the Critique of Pure Reason he links experience with sensation. At the same time he finds in experience other kinds of knowledge which must have their origin *a priori*. In addition to these two kinds of knowledge Reason introduces a third by means of concepts to which experience can never supply corresponding objects. This threefold division of the kinds of

knowledge to which there must correspond a like division in the knowing subject constitutes the foundation of Kant's great work. Having once established this division it is easy to proceed backward and forward from Empirical Realism to Transcendental Idealism. The understanding combines the facts of experience into a world which is absolutely phenomenal and therefore transcendental. At the same time the possibility of experience determines this phenomenal world to such an extent that it may be called empirically realistic. In other words, Kant never got beyond the boundary line drawn by Hume which limits knowledge to perception.

It was without question a scientific procedure on the part of these two great thinkers to isolate a faculty of the mind and examine it alone ; but, by so doing they severed its relations and rendered it to that extent mutilated. If we remember this fact when we are examining Transcendental Idealism we shall not be so easily carried along by its plausibility. Let it once be admitted, for example, that the possibility of experience is determined by sensation and the understanding, and that the concept of God is an ideal of Pure Reason, by which we understand the formal sphere of thought, then the possibility of giving a content to the concept of God is given up. Such an admission forever destroys the possibility of a connection between the God of Reason and the God of Religion. To say "*Hoc es Tu*" is always precluded. But when we remember that all experience has a validity according to its kind and that one faculty cannot stand alone, the severed connection is reestablished again.

Now let us see how Kant attacks the Anselmic problem. How does he relate concept and reality ? Take a passage in which he is speaking of objects of sense. He says :¹ "Hitherto it has been supposed that all our knowledge must conform to the objects ; but under that supposition, all attempts* to establish anything about them *a priori*, by means of concepts, and thus to enlarge our knowledge, have come to nothing. . . . If the intuition had to conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see

¹ Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason," p. 693.

how we can know anything of it *a priori*; but if the object conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I can very well conceive such a possibility."

The burden of this argument is to show that since the mind introduces *a priori* concepts into objects of knowledge, therefore, these objects so far as known constitute phenomena and the *thing-in-itself* — the Real — is unknown. The conclusion is that "the unconditioned must not be looked for in things so far as we know them but only in so far as we do not know them." The *phenomenal world* embracing every possible object of knowledge is at hand, and outside and beyond the reach of experience stands the unconditioned constituting *the intelligible world*. In the Kantian epistemology knowledge is limited absolutely to the realm of concept and on the other hand Reality embracing the intelligible world is unknowable. At the same time Kant ever regarded the manifold of objects composing the phenomenal world as objects of experience. And while these objects of experience and possible experience are not to be taken as things-in-themselves they are none the less real. In this latter sense Kant called himself an empirical Realist. But in the sense that all knowledge is phenomenal he called himself a transcendental Idealist. Such a theory is an advance upon pure Realism. It introduces a relation between concept and reality in the phenomenal world even if it does deny the possibility of communication between the *Noumenal* and *Phenomenal* worlds. It requires of a concept that it must be valid, that the concept and its object must agree, though both concept and object are alike phenomena.

This then is the answer which Critical Rationalism gives to our question. It has received a tolerably general acceptance but not without hesitation. We are vaguely conscious of its insufficiency. The question asked by Spinoza "How can we know?" is avoided by limiting the sphere of knowledge. Therefore in spite of his transcendental Idealism Kant continued to be a Realist. The *ding an sich* for him was ever an independent Reality. When these facts concerning the Kantian theory of knowledge are settled in our minds we are prepared for his criticism of the Ontological

Proof. In such a system an *ens realissimum* could be necessary only as a formal condition of thought. It is a purely regulative concept. The conclusions concerning a greatest conceivable being are rational deductions of logic. But when an account of religious experience is demanded the system breaks down as Kant was conscious of its break down in the presence of a categorical imperative. The Ontological Proof therefore has this advantage that while it does connect with the Ideal of pure reason it also connects with the conscious experience of a Religious life.

Kant's Criticism. — Let us look now at Kant's criticism of our Proof in the light of what we have here stated. He begins by asserting¹ that "the concept of an absolutely necessary Being is a concept of pure reason, a mere idea, the objective reality of which is by no means proved by the fact that reason requires it." Then he proceeds to inquire concerning the conditions which make it necessary to consider the nonexistence of a thing as absolutely inconceivable. The inadequacy of examples of absolute necessity such as that a triangle must have three angles is immediately apparent. The necessity is in the judgment not in the things. There is no contradiction in admitting the nonexistence of both the triangle and its angles. This is true, but to conceive of the nonexistence of the concept of a triangle when it has once been conceived is not possible. The reality of the triangle may be dropped but not the reality of the concept. On the other hand the very peculiarity of the Ontological concept is that we cannot conceive the nonexistence of either the concept or its object. Kant persists in putting the concept of God into the same category with the concept of things while the very nature of such a concept requires that it should be individual and not general, singular and therefore without comparison. The analogy of triangles, real and possible *Thalers* or mountains and valleys will not hold, for in the case of triangles we are dealing with mathematical concepts which are empty of content and in the case of mountains we are dealing with a general concept with a possible content, while in thinking of God we are dealing with an individual concept which must

¹ Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason," p. 477.

have a real content. To conceive an individual concept without an object is impossible. So soon as the object disappears it is a general concept. I have already affirmed that the proposition — God exists—is an analytical judgment. When I make this assertion according to Kant I am compelled to determine whether *the concept is God* or whether I deduce his existence from *internal possibility*. In its purpose and intention my concept is God but that is not enough. Consciousness reveals to me that something exists. Anything is an *ens realissimum* in comparison with non-existence. The greatest conceivable being therefore is a real being because no figment of the imagination is so great as what is real. To be sure such an argument does not take us beyond Pantheism so far as the content of our idea is concerned but it gives us a foothold in Reality, and Religious experience must furnish a content to the concept. I am willing to admit therefore that for matters of fact in general every proposition involving existence is synthetic but I still assert that the concept of Absolute Being involves existence. To be more explicit our knowledge of things depends upon the possibility of experience but for our knowledge of self as Descartes discovered and our knowledge of God according to Anselm's argument we are thrown back upon consciousness as an original faculty.

In this examination of Kant we have allowed ourselves to become involved in the same speculative method which we have deprecated. This, however, is unavoidable in this part of our subject, the Proof must be sustained or it will have no place for a practical content. If Critical Rationalism does not tell us how to pass from concept to reality we do not therefore give up in despair. One favorable sign also is here to be noted. The critical philosophy is psychological. It looks for the possibilities of knowledge within, in the precincts of the mind. If this at first appeared to be fatal to Religion it was only apparently so. Religion also is within. It too has experiences which come clamoring into the manifold of phenomena. An increased attention to Psychology, therefore, could not fail to uncover the religious precincts of the soul. When we have finished our inquiry concerning concept and reality this subject will be attended to at greater length.

Idealism. — Realism with its impossible independence of concept and object has failed to help us. Critical Rationalism suggests that the concept must be valid for the reality which it represents but it shuts up concepts to sense and understanding thus circumscribing knowable phenomena. Mysticism on the other hand depreciates the usefulness of experience. We must turn, therefore, to Idealism as a last resort. But before listening to the answer of Idealism concerning the relation of concept and Reality let us revert to our analysis of a religious consciousness. We there discovered three original factors. Every religious emotion is inseparably combined with an idea. Fear and faith alike sub-tend the idea of an object to which they are directed. And every idea enfolds a purpose, a meaning, an intention or a will. It is at heart an intention with an end in view. With this threefoldness of religious consciousness before our mind we are prepared more completely to study the relation of concept to Being or the religious idea to its Object in the light of Idealism.

In the first place Idealism holds that an Idea is related to its object. The object itself may be material or imaginary, it may be sensible or only intelligible but whatever it is, some tie must connect it with its concept. And in the second place this theory holds that no objects stand alone. In some way or other there is a unity of all things — a linkedness of all facts. Mere likeness, then, is not a sufficient tie to connect an idea with its object. Two things as like as coins struck from the same die may exist in absolute independence. In the third place then, Idealism finds the only sufficient account of the relation of the object and the idea in the purpose of the idea. It is the intention of the idea both to seek its object and to seek its point of likeness to its object. It is true that the object does determine the idea. It is the will of the idea to be determined but just because of this relation the idea and the object cannot exist independently.

Experience. — This brings us to the realm of experience. So long as we are dealing with the objects of sense the object determines the idea in its validity. But experience reveals the important fact that the object found never fully satisfies the meaning of

the idea. The possibility of experience therefore rather than the experience itself constitutes the determining power of objects over ideas. And since the idea has a purpose it can never find an object completely fulfilling the requirement of validity until it finds that purpose manifested in a vital reality. In other words the idea is the expression of a finite self seeking its fulfillment in an Absolute Self. And "the Being to which any idea refers is simply the will of the idea more determinately and more completely expressed."¹ "The finite idea does seek its own Other. It consciously means this Other. And it can seek only what it consciously means to seek. But it consciously means to seek precisely that determination of its own will to singleness and finality of expression which shall leave it no Other yet beyond, and still to seek."

Let us see now how this conception of the relation of Concept and Being agrees with the argument of the Ontological Proof. The idea there is called — "*id quo majus cogitari nequit*," the greatest conceivable Being. The purpose of this idea is to find its object, its Other. It turns to the God of religious experience and says "*Hoc es Tu*." In other words it identifies the God of faith with the God of Reason. Experience furnishes a content for the concept of God just as truly as experience furnishes a content for any finite reality. The process is precisely the same, the only difference is in the faculties involved. By this I mean that every experience is fragmentary. It only partly fulfills its concept. The possibility of experience is the only complete determination of a finite concept. And in a like manner religious experience does not fulfill the concept of God. It is only fragmentary. Nevertheless it embodies the will of the Ontological idea.

¹ Royce, "The World and the Individual," p. 353.

PART II.

THE IDEA OF GOD AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

I.

THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO PSYCHOLOGY.

Religion and Psychology.—The examination of the various theories of knowledge brought out the fact that the concept of a most perfect being is dependent upon religious experience for its content. It is necessary therefore to inquire what this experience is and to listen to the evidence of Psychology concerning its worth. The spheres of Religion and Psychology owing to their functions and subject matter always overlap. Every form of experience comes within the realm of Psychology and a Religion on the other hand without an experience is impossible. At the same time Religion precedes Psychology and furnishes the facts for its investigation. Religion is a part of conscious life and Psychology is a science which treats of the laws and forms and methods of conscious life.

In a certain sense it might be said that Religion has a Psychology of its own. As an inner experience it requires reflection and introspection, and to some extent it always attempts to give definitions to those inner powers and seats of the emotions which we think of under the general term, soul. On the other hand a more fully developed Psychology serves as a guiding principle for Religion. In this way the two react upon each other and very much depends upon which has the predominating influence. Buddhism furnishes an example of a Religion in which the Psychological element predominates. In its pure form it is little more than a Psychology. Christianity, on the other hand, is a Religion

which takes Psychology into its service. The Sacred Writings of the Christians and Jews show a deep psychological penetration. Body and spirit are distinguished, the value of the soul is declared and a valuable analysis of the inner life is apparent. But all this is in the service of Religion and a part of religious development.

It is quite another thing when all Religion is assumed to be pathological — “a sick man’s dream.” “The psychologist, observing the dependence of mental states on bodily conditions” and seeing the various psychic phenomena which Religion invariably includes, may be led to conclude that it is altogether an internal matter and that he can account for it as a psycho-genetic phenomena. To a person floundering in the vortex of such a conclusion Professor James says: ¹ “It is not the origin with which we are concerned, but the way in which it works on the whole.” Such a severing of the fruit from the root, however, must strike a serious reader as a violent proceeding. At such a time the Ontological Idea appears as a regulative principle and directs attention to the necessary connections between things psychical and the ultra psychical.

In the examination of the relation of the Ontological Proof to the various concepts of Being a large part of our effort was spent in an endeavor to rescue Religion from rationalism. We saw how the various theories of knowledge rendered religious thought fruitless by turning it into speculative channels. Materialism, Deism, Theism and Agnosticism have appeared as the outgrowth of speculative inquiry severed from experience. The Ontological Proof there furnished us a clue by which these speculative difficulties could be avoided. It joins together what we must never put asunder — religious thought and religious life. Now in the face of an attack by materialistic Psychology our Proof again serves us; since, it links experience with thought as well as thought with experience. Professor Flint in the Baird Lectures says ² of the *a priori* arguments: “They help us steadily to con-

¹ James, “Varieties of Religious Experience,” p. 13.

² Flint, “Baird Lectures, Theism,” p. 288.

template and patiently to consider such abstract and difficult thoughts as those of being, absolute being, cause, substance, perfection, infinity, eternity, etc." Such mental gymnastics no doubt have their usefulness in developing an athletic mind but they are about as valuable as learning the Shorter Catechism backward, so far as practical Religion is concerned. They are worse than that because they pervert what they seem to contemplate from its true significance. If we are seeking an ulterior value in the Ontological Proof, it is to be found in the Psychological turn it gave to thought and the relation it establishes between thought and experience. It is introspective, and when attention is once directed to that which is within, a large field is at once opened for investigation. It is true that the first fruit of this research was largely the logomachy of Scholasticism, but later Descartes searched deeper than the ideas with which the schoolmen quibbled and discovered consciousness itself, the connecting link between thought and Being. The close connection between this discovery, which is the starting point of modern philosophy and psychology, and the Ontological Proof could not have been accidental. This is apparent in the *Meditations*. Hear what he says:¹ "Is there any truth more clear than the existence of a Supreme Being, or of God, seeing that it is to his essence alone that existence pertains? And although the right perception of this truth *has cost me much close thinking* nevertheless at present I feel not only as certain of it as of what I deem most certain, but I remark further that the certitude of all other truths is so absolutely dependent on it, that without this knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly." It was "the close thinking" called forth by the Ontological Proof which led by way of doubt to the discovery of consciousness and thus to the establishment of the truth itself. But Descartes' purpose was speculative rather than practical and instead of holding fast to the relation of consciousness and the concept of a most perfect being, he followed the concept to a cause which must be greater than its concept and used Consciousness as the starting point of a rational Psychology.

¹ Descartes, "*Meditations*," V, p. 148.

The Psychologists.—In this way Psychology was born of Religion and was separated from it. In the hands of Locke, Hume, Kant, *et al.*, Psychology assumed the field of experience and religion was restricted to rational spheres of speculation. Hume classes himself with ¹ "that Species of Philosophers which consider man in the light of a reasonable being and endeavor to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. (Who) regard human nature as a subject of speculation, and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behavior." On the other hand he says: ² "Examine the religious principles, which have, in fact, prevailed in the world. You will scarcely be persuaded that they are anything but *sick men's dreams*." Thus human nature was magnified and Religion despised. It was impossible that such conditions should continue. A better Psychology and a more appreciative conception of Religion have succeeded and their relation to each other is increasingly helpful. No reverent student of Religion can refuse to welcome the contributions of such psychologists as Wundt, Höffding, James and Meyer. Their work is invaluable and no solution of the Problems of Religion is now to be expected without a thorough psychology of religious experience.

One other point is to be noted concerning the relation of Religion to Psychology. Various authorities on the Philosophy of Religion have endeavored to connect Religion with one or other faculty of the soul. Schleiermacher's definition ³ of Religion as *an absolute feeling of dependence* on God gave undue prominence to the emotional element of Religion. Deism and Rationalism in general magnify the intellectual element. Von Hartmann gives prominence to the will. Such expressions ⁴ as "Der religiöse Wille ist das *A* und *Q* aller Religion," or any definitions which give predominance to any particular faculty find a regulative in

¹ Hume, "Essays," Vol. II, p. 1. Greene and Grose.

² Hume, "The Natural History of Religion," p. 362.

³ Schleiermacher, "Der christliche Glaubenslehre," p. 3.

⁴ Hartmann, "Religions-philosophie," vol. 2, p. 55.

our theory which gives to each faculty its place and prominence in a religious life.

II.

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

Introspection. — When Kant said¹ of the Ontological Proof: "It leaves all experience out of account and concludes entirely *a priori* from mere concepts, the existence of a supreme cause," he certainly was not wide enough in his generalization. If sensuous experience is intended, the truth of the assertion might be admitted; but experience is as broad and possibly broader than consciousness and in this sense the Anselmic form of the proof is rather an appeal to experience. By its very nature it withdraws attention from the world and directs it inward. It is a conscious appeal to the soul for a knowledge of God. In other words the Ontological Proof necessitated the development of Psychology. Here again Anselm received the mantle of Augustine. In a pure spirit of literalism Augustine sought to vindicate the doctrine of the Trinity by careful introspection. If God had said "Let us make man in our own image." And "in the image of God created He him," then it is reasonable to search in man for the image of God. Such was the reasoning that led Augustine to give to the world his *De Trinitate*. Without estimating the success of this work, so far as its object is concerned, we are much interested in the worth of its method. It made inner experience the foundation of metaphysics. And Anselm was simply returning to this method when he sought in himself² "for a single argument which would suffice to prove that there is indeed a God."

In our analysis of consciousness we saw that emotions are inseparably linked with ideas. Without the idea of God religious emotions could not come into existence. "Kine Religion ohne Gottesvorstellung die Gottesvorstellung ist der bewusste Ausgangspunkt aller religiösen Funktion" is von Hartmann's³ statement

¹ Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason," p. 476.

² Anselm, "Proslogion," Int.

³ Hartmann, "Religions-philosophie," Vol. II, p. 6.

of this truth. Now Religion itself is a fact. It is with us as certainly as any of the facts of conscious life. The religious emotions also are well determined elements of experience. We know them precisely as we know other forms of conscious experience. Therefore the idea of God does not stand in isolation — a product of the rational faculty — but is inseparably yoked to conscious experience. We learned further in our study of ideas that they are vitalized by a purpose. An idea without an intention does not arise. We must now appeal to experience to show that it is the intention, the meaning of the idea of God to mediate between religious experience and the existing Other of that experience. Our method would have been more logical if we had taken up the religious experiences first and, after examining them in the light of Psychology, then had proceeded to our inquiry concerning the relation of the concept to being. But that method would not have been so natural, since experience always proceeds from the objective to the subjective. We attend to the object with interest long before the psychical functions come to our notice. And in a like manner a study of the development of Religion verifies the statement that the idea of God precedes the idea of self in consciousness.

Consciousness. — Some of the steps in the development of Psychology in relation to Religion were noted in the last chapter. Our interest is centered in the connection of the Ontological Proof with this development. The nature of this proof requires introspection and while the attention of the mind is turned inward it finds ideas, such as the concept of a perfect being, but if such abstraction is continued long enough it must perceive in addition to the ideas of the mind the fact of consciousness. This we are led to believe was what took place in the mind of Descartes. He was looking for a starting point which doubt could not remove — a truth which would act or abide as his fulcrum that he might move the world of thought. He found this truth in the intuitive knowledge of self — in consciousness. By this discovery of consciousness as the primary fact of knowledge he gave a valuable truth to the world and a great impulse to both Psychology and

Religion. Henceforth experience of whatever nature requires a scientific treatment. Sensuous experience at first, very reasonably, claimed attention. In the hands of the Empiricists it for a time appeared that this was the only experience worthy of attention but consciousness is broader than sensation and it was impossible that other forms of experience should not sooner or later take their place along with the other facts of life.

Without specifying the source to which Religious emotions are to be traced they must be recognized as facts. They form a part of the sum total of Reality. They are forces which have to be reckoned with, they can be dealt with and measured. In speaking of religious emotions in this way we are classifying them along with the real as opposed to the conceptual phenomena of the universe. As having ideas inseparably connected with them they belong to rational quantities but as moving active forces they belong to the world of facts. The realm of religious experience is now open before us.

Primary Facts of Consciousness.—There are two facts discovered by consciousness which resist further analysis. The first is existence and the second is finiteness and limitation. Affirmation and negation, I am, and I am limited, are the primary analytical judgments of consciousness. These two facts of experience are the coördinates of all possible experience. In so far as I exist under these conditions experience is necessary for me. On the other hand experience is impossible for nonexistent or an unlimited being. Thus it appears that a limited consciousness occupies some intermediate place between nonexistence and perfect being. Again consciousness reveals that the limitations of human nature are temporal and spatial in form. All human experience is subject to these limitations. In content the limitation may be sensuous or nonsensuous, pathetic or antipathetic; they may either help or hinder the conscious individual. This constitutes the relation of an individual personality to all that is without or beyond him.

The distinction between the rational and material parts of a self is also a very early work of self-consciousness. The mind by

means of its ideas transcends the limitations of the body. The ideas of the mind very definitely ally themselves with the non-sensuous limitations and seek to penetrate and master those which are sensuous. It is in this struggle for the mastery that Religion appears. To involve ourselves in the hopeless task of giving a terse definition of Religion is altogether outside of our purpose but it is within our topic to indicate that Religion in its psychological analysis is neither knowledge nor feeling nor will alone but that it subsidizes all these faculties in religious functions. It does not matter whether we accept this tripartate division of the faculties of the mind or follow some other division, it is the psychical consciousness which puts the mind in reciprocity with the world of sense and the religious consciousness discovers those facts and objects with which Religion is concerned and relates the entire mind to them. The world is an object which experience accepts and identifies and reacts upon; but, it has no finality in which a religious consciousness can rest, for it is also subject to limitations. And a limited self, conscious of its own incompleteness, must seek beyond the world for the satisfaction of that lack which it knows in experience.

Primary Religious Emotion.—Here then one of the primary religious emotions is discovered; one that makes its appearance in primitive or undeveloped stages of religious life and is most prominent in the most highly developed religions. It is not fear and it is not faith. It is an emotion which arises from a limited consciousness possessed of ideas which transcend its limitations. It is that attitude of longing which precedes expressions of faith and worship—a reaching out for help, a quest for a helper in the struggle of life. Such an emotion must be traced back from its expression in the examination of low stages of Religion. In more cultured minds it gives utterance to the yearning cry: “As the hart panteth after the waterbrooks, so panteth my soul after Thee, O God.” It was to this emotion that Augustine gave a definite form when he said: “O Lord, Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it find rest in Thee.”¹ The sacred

¹ Augustine, “Confessions,” p. 1.

books of all religions are full of more or less definite cries of this kind. It is the conscious effort of an individual and limited self to escape the orphanhood of individuality, the restlessness produced by the consciousness or even the pain of limitations and the purpose of ideas to find their Other beyond these limitations. In this sense Religion must be as broad as humanity and all Religion is essentially, even if very indefinitely, monotheistic. Man is a religion-making being because he is a limited individuality and the limits which seem to hinder him become the stairway on which he ascends to communion and union with the unlimited. In other words where limits and ideas transcending those limits are combined in one being a Religion becomes a necessity. The limited one finding in himself ideas which go beyond^z himself is in so far related to the Object which the ideas represent. The longing is for the confirmation of this relation. Thus the emotion which is still physical and expresses itself physically and the idea which is purely psychical and belongs to the nonmaterial representations of consciousness, almost coalesce, for the purpose of both the emotion and the idea is in the helpful relation of the Other of the idea to the need of the self.

This emotion as it develops may take the form of fear or faith according to the predominance of the limitations or the idea in attention. It may selfishly concern itself with its own welfare or generously take thought for the unlimited to which it belongs. It may be submissive or defiant according to the temperament of the individual; but whichever of these characteristics may belong to it, the root of such a religious experience so far as psychology is concerned is to be found in the limitation of the individual human life.

We need not suppose that the Ontological Idea which our theory links with this primary religious emotion is necessarily definite or its concept completely analyzed. It is the very essence of our contention that an historical experience is necessary to give this idea a content and that nothing less than a perfect experience will complete its analysis. Nevertheless, the religious process of knowing is not different from other processes of knowing. The simple

sensation does not come into consciousness unless it is joined with a percept. The percept does not stand alone but determines a concept and experience never completely fills the concept. Neither does religious experience ever fully satisfy the Ontological concept. There is, however, a content which may be derived from the mind in itself or may as well be derived from Reality itself. Either way its origin is equally mysterious. I refer to the beyond — all that a limited consciousness recognizes as beyond its limitations. Professor Max Müller calls¹ it “the perception of the infinite.” He finds it in space and time and causality or what Kant calls the forms of thought. According to both, these forms are psychical. They are *a priori* so far as experience is concerned. With this admission it is difficult to see how the former can sustain his principle, “Nihil est in fide quod non antea fuerit in sensu.” But that is aside from our argument, it is the historic data with which he illustrates his thesis that interests us. The dawn, the nightly sky, clouds, trees and rivers not only might furnish “Theogonic Elements,”² but they have furnished these elements as his examination of many sacred books distinctly shows. These matters of fact in nature were each embraced by the infinite and being perceived as facts of experience carried the mind onward in its conception of the infinite. Thus we find the vague indefinite idea, perception of the infinite if you choose to call it so, but I prefer to reserve that term for the faculty by which we apprehend all that is not infinite, and the emotion made more intense by the very indefiniteness of the Object which arouses it.

Shamanism and Divination. — Along with this primary emotion there are certain practices of primitive religions which tenaciously survive even in cultured societies, such as Shamanism and Divination, which may well be noticed in this place. The two practices along with their functionaries are not peculiar or surprising in the light of what we have just said. They reflect the two greatest limitations of humanity — a lack of power and a lack of foresight. The arts of the Shaman are used to constrain the un-

¹ Müller, “The Gifford Lectures, 1888, Natural Religion,” p. 188.

² Müller, “The Gifford Lectures, 1888, Natural Religion,” p. 148.

seen powers to lend their aid to man. To make rain, to drive out inimical spirits or to give victory, will in so far, put the one aided beyond his limitations. Such contributions of aid are ever desirable. The methods by which it is thought that such aid can be constrained no doubt reflect crude anthropomorphisms; but with that we are not concerned. And again, the uncertainty of the future is a time limitation which ever presses heavily on the understanding of humanity and those who feel these limitations seek to obtain from those who are not thus limited the secrets of the future, hence Divination.

Idols. — But the question arises in connection with the interpretation of Fetichism — if we accept that as a primitive form of Religion — Why do people in that stage of culture seek a multitude of gods and make use of objects of an inferior order if they possess anything of the nature of an Ontological Idea? Or how is it possible to say that all Religion is in a sense monotheistic when polytheism is in such cases so apparent? One might with as much reason ask why the savage hunts in certain fields and fishes in neighboring streams of a bounded territory. His limitations make it necessary. It is a temporary makeshift. He seeks help first from that which is nearest at hand. If “he sacrificeth unto his net and burneth incense unto his drag”¹ and makes a god of the charred end of that which has made him warm, he is at least acknowledging that the drag and the wood have played a godlike part in extending the bounds of his limitations. But the very fact that the Animist multiplies the objects of his devotion and idealizes his fetish indefinitely until multiplicity gives place to unity, as in the Pantheism of Hinduism, renders it evident, that no limited object satisfies that primary emotion of longing with its idea, which is at the root of all religious experience. Without its idea this emotion cannot appear in experience and however vague or illusory it may be consciousness bears witness to the fact of its presence. It is possible and the history of Religion shows that it is a fact that in the undeveloped condition of the human understanding at various stages of its

¹ Habakkuk 1 : 16.

culture this longing and its idea attach themselves to this and that object, temporarily seeking satisfaction, but in no case is there evidence that in such conditions the mind finds rest.

From these considerations we may conclude that an Animistic theory of the origin of Religion instead of confuting rather confirms the presuppositions of the Ontological Proof. Let it once be understood that the Ontological Idea is not definite and analyzed in every human mind but that it is an idea with an infinite capacity for analysis and the difficulty in accepting it is removed. The one element of the idea, however, which is primary, is that it involves existence objective to the thinker, otherwise Religion and being itself and even consciousness might be denied.

There are two fields to which the Ontological Idea may turn in its quest for its Other or object. One is *the material world* with its manifold forces and the other is *the mind* with its complex of phenomena. The combination of these two spheres is also possible in religious thought. We have already seen how the nature worshiper as a temporary makeshift does obeisance to an inferior object. What object will become prominent in his pantheon is simply a matter of *attention* and a great step forward is taken when some superior man is fixed upon as the object of devotion and adoration. From henceforth the anthropomorphization of other objects of nature is an easy process, for the idea refusing to be satisfied with either the fetish or the hero as a final object of worship, must continue the search further.

The Gods. — In the choice of objects of worship the great facts and objects soon claimed attention. The myths concerning the sun god, the rain god, etc., can be traced back to the Akkadians. These larger objects of nature had entered into their pantheon long before the dawn of history.¹ These myths represent an interesting stage in the progress of a search for the Object of Religion in the external objects of nature. They show the constant reaction between the mind's conception of the infinite and its perception of the finite. These two mental processes were constantly at work harmonizing the facts of limited experience with the concep-

¹Tiele, "History of Religion."

tion of what is beyond experience. At this point of religious culture two steps were possible and were actually taken. One was the deification of all objects, or *Pantheism*; and, the other dispensed with the temporal limitations of thought and postulated *immortality*. This development could hardly be escaped where material objects were deified. The perishableness of objects and the conflicts of the forces of nature which gave material for the myths also indicated that these objects had temporal as well as material limitations. The death of the gods was always a possibility. But the mind having fixed upon the sky, the sun, the rain, etc., as objects of worship and at the same time perceiving their limitations, did not need to take a great leap when it combined all things into a Brahma. Its creed then becomes: "All this universe indeed in Brahma: from him it does proceed; into him it dissolves; in him it breathes."¹ To such a god immortality may easily be ascribed.

We must remember, however, that Pantheism is a philosophy rather than a Religion. Brahma was never worshiped in the all-absorbing way that *Yahweh* or *Allah* appeal to their worshippers. Neither has the intellectual love of a pantheistic deity which Spinoza suggested as the highest Religion appealed to humanity. All that the mind has been able to make of Pan is a great fetish which involves an appalling fatalism.

Roman Religion.—The history of the Religion of Rome presents a striking example of the transition, which the Ontological Idea makes in its search for its Other, from the physical to the psychical field. The old gods, the objective gods, were still revered but *Mens*, *Virtus*, *Pudicitia*, *Fides*, and other internal faculties and graces were introduced into their pantheon. Temples were erected to these deities and they were adored along with the other gods. Max Müller represents² that Regulus would rather die than dishonor *Fides*. And no doubt a similar religious motive prompted Virginius to sacrifice his daughter rather than allow her allegiance to *Pudicitia* to be broken. Other examples

¹ Quoted by Dr. Ellinwood in "Notes on Comparative Religions."

² Müller, "The Gifford Lectures, 1888, Natural Religion," p. 176.

might be cited but these are sufficient to indicate that the internal field is the ethical field of search for an object of religious worship.

It will be better, however, to pursue our psychological inquiries a little further before taking up this topic.

Some of the higher forms of religious experience demand our attention in this connection. They do not differ in their final analysis from what we have already observed. The same consciousness of limitation and the same idealism is present accompanied with a greater complexity and definiteness.¹ Such phenomena as *Metanoia*, *Enthusiasm* and *Mysticism* here claim our attention. These are experiences which are recognized as facts and forces in the world as well as in the lives of individuals. They have become constructive principles in determining the lives of men whom the world chooses to honor and as forces they have had a visible part in making history. In the conclusion of his Gifford Lectures, Professor James says :² "Religion includes . . . a new zest which adds itself like a gift to life, and takes the form either of lyrical enchantment or of appeal to earnestness and heroism. Also an assurance of safety and a temper of peace and, in relation to others, a preponderance of loving affection."

Metanoia.—One of these experiences is named in the Gospels *Metanoia*.³ This significant word occurs so frequently in these sacred books that we may well believe that it indicates a characteristic experience. It also points out the mind as the part of the individual in which the experience takes place. The well-known meaning of *metanoia* is a change of mind with a corresponding change of character. In such an experience a moral element is involved. The limitations of a sensuous kind which require the help of a God of power have given place to limitations of a

¹ Professor James in his Gifford Lectures on "The Varieties of Religious Experience" and Professor Starbuck in his work on the "Psychology of Religion," have made valuable collections of testimonies bearing on this topic and have subjected them to a psychological treatment, but we can only hope to make use of their conclusions in so far as they bear upon our subject.

² James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 485.

³ I have used the Greek word *metanoia* instead of its English equivalent repentance because the latter has a double significance.

spiritual nature which require the help of a God of holiness. But in the case of this higher experience just the same as in the case of the lower experience the idea anticipates the experience and prepares the way for it.

I can quite understand the psychologist's description of the brain's function in this process. That such a change of mind as is indicated by the term *metanoia* and is commonly known as *Conversion*, should be accompanied and accomplished by a transference of the habitual center of personal energy ; that religious ideas, previously peripheral in consciousness, take a central place, and religious aims form the habitual center of energy is quite intelligible. All this, however, is simply descriptive.. It tells what takes place without the *how* and *why*. Psychology, therefore, simply adds its testimony. Something does take place. How peripheral religious centers come to exist and why their content when once illuminated lends a new zest to character, which common sense chooses to esteem valuable, has not been made known. Neither is the cause of the transference discoverable among the mind's peculiar forces. It is not within the sphere of psychology to furnish an escape from idealism any more than it is within its sphere to solve the problem of consciousness itself. And in the problem furnished by religious *metanoia* we are again thrown back upon the law of the inseparable unity of experience and ideas. The God-idea has only taken a more definite form. Its moral character unfolding itself over against the moral limits which the individual's growing consciousness discovers.

Let us see if such an explanation is consistent with our theory of the Ontological Proof. The psychologist has told us of the transference of centers of consciousness. The idea of a most perfect being has occupied an inferior place in consciousness. Other orders of being and other purposes toward them have occupied the center of illumination, but the mind's readiness to occupy itself with that which is more perfect is a clue to the fact that its quest is the most Perfect. In the experience known as *Metanoia* the idea of God in the Christian's sense has received a greater illumination and the one who experiences the *metanoia* oppressed

by his limitations is conscious of a transference of thought and affection from some inferior means of attaining his end to the superior means even to a fellowship and union with the unlimited Father. The consciousness of renewed strength accompanying this change becomes to the receiver an infallible sign of the reality of the Being to whom his idea led him. The purpose of the idea and the experience coincide. Such an one can truly say "*Hoc es Tu Domine Deus noster.*" The relation is no longer looked upon as the relation between an idea and its other. The purpose of the idea is fulfilled. The relation is a fact — a living experience. In such a stage of religious culture the immediacy of Religion is found not only in the emotions of the worshiper but also in his relation to the Object of his adoration.

This brings us to the threshold of mysticism. We are arrested, however, by the very nature of worship. Mysticism seeks to transcend worship by ignoring its two-fold nature. It abandons the progressive method of unfolding the idea of God to which our Ontological Proof admonishes us to adhere and seeks by intuition to grasp reality in its totality. Before speaking of this matter more fully let us attend to worship as a religious discipline.

Worship. — This discussion is appropriate in this place because worship expresses the two-fold character of the highest religious experience. It manifests both sides of the consciousness of a soul which has entered into fellowship with the Divine and yet continues in a body of flesh. It has due regard for the "perseverance of the saints" and the irresistible grace of God. "It is a mysterious thing," says Jonathan Edwards,¹ "and what has puzzled and amazed many a good Christian, that there should be that which is so divine and precious, as the saving grace of God, and the new and divine nature, dwelling in the same heart, with so much corruption, hypocrisy and iniquity, in a particular saint." And Paul who has set forth the doctrine of union with God in Christ in the greatest fulness, said² "We have this treasure in

¹ Edwards, "Works," Vol. 4, p. 4.

² 2 Cor. 4:7.

earthen vessels." Worship consciously expresses both these facts. It combines humility with exaltation. The worshiper is in fellowship with the more perfect or most perfect being and to that extent he has passed beyond his finiteness. Yet as an individual he is still finite and conscious of his limitations. As a Polytheist man sacrifices to his drag because the drag had extended his power of sustaining life, so as a Christian he says ² in pious devotion, "I can do all things in Him that strengtheneth me," an assumption that fellowship with his God transcends all finite limitations.

Worship does not appear in this treatment as a primary religious function. It is rather an attitude after the fact — a product of Religion. Nevertheless worship is a valuable activity and stands on the border line between religious and social functions. One cannot fail to be impressed with the similarity of the conduct of courtiers, to that of worshipers. In fact the differentiation of rulers from deities is a late and to some extent an impossible proceeding. Even in the highest religions the duties to rulers are enfolded in the duties to God. The man who has reverence for whatever helps him over an obstacle could not in reason overlook the duty he owes to his chieftain or ruler. But this is going outside of our sphere which is distinctly religious, it is more to the point to notice that worship and the spirit of worship as we find them in a religious life are altogether in harmony with our representation of the Ontological Proof. On the one hand they are rooted in experience and recognize the bounds of everyday life ; on the other hand they are ideal, reaching out with fear and faith to a more perfect if not the most perfect Being. Here we certainly have matter of fact. There is a great difference in range between the worship of a St. Francis or a Tolstoy and the worship of a peasant at a wayside shrine or the cringing of an animist before his fetish but in all that vast difference there is no by-way of escape from this two-fold nature of worship. The experience and the idea live and die together.

Saintliness. — It has been our effort up to this point to show that the *a priori* proof of the existence of an Object of Religion is

² Philippians 4 : 13.

in harmony with psychology and anthropology. These two sciences have been greatly developed in recent years and the facts which they have discovered must be accepted and affiliated in any theory of life. So far we have found no cause to abandon our theory on their account. There remains to be examined under the present topic what could be termed *the development of saintliness*. In its more exact significance saintliness means a life separated from the world and consecrated to the pursuit of godliness. It is my intention to use the word in the broader evangelical sense of "growth in grace"—life in contact with the world and in communion with God. In this sense the knight as well as the hermit is a religious person and the unwarranted distinction between the sacred and the secular life is broken down. This is the form that Christianity, especially Protestant Christianity, has taken at the present day. Religion is cultivated in and in harmony with a life of affairs. Union and communion with God are accepted in the subjugation of a material world. Such a view of life is optimistic. Instead of looking upon the material world as antipathetic and subversive to piety it accepts all things, as servants to the soul, though they may be at times insubordinate. With such a view of life, development is almost a postulate. The conception of a *metanoia* which brings the soul into union with the Object of Religion in no wise dispenses with the process of development. The current theory of religious experience follows the analogy furnished by Biology in supposing that each religious life passes through the stages represented in the historic development of Religion. This analogy is no doubt overworked but at the same time the development of saintliness is a well authenticated process.

Our treatment of this form of religious experience falls in line with our treatment of worship and our entire theory. The idea of God stands over against an ever unfolding life but the unfolding of the religious life is always toward the God-idea which has anticipated it. Thus an ever-increasing knowledge of the content of the God-idea serves to make conscious of the manifold limitations of finite individuality and "growth in grace" is the

process of making real the transcendence of limitations which faith has apprehended in the ideal.

Crises. — A lack of knowledge concerning the psychology of religious experience has been a fruitful source of controversy on this point. What are known as crises in experience are more obvious and striking than the regular every day experiences of life. I refer to sudden conversions and deluges of enthusiasm. Like all extraordinary events such facts rivet attention. Those who build upon such experiences fail to recognize the cumulative processes of the mind which are well known to the psychologist. Comforting as these extraordinary processes are, to the person who has realized them, and useful as they have been in the development of the religious life, we are compelled to look upon them as abnormal and to classify them with other well-known natural events of an unwholesome character. The healthy, religious mind finds that it does well not to expect a sudden flood of knowledge or of character stuff but to grow in grace and increase in the knowledge of the Lord. In such a growth experience and faith are the coördinates of knowledge.

We have now examined some characteristic religious experiences. They are in no way out of harmony with what our interpretation of the Ontological Proof would lead us to expect. We have confined our attention perhaps too closely to the Christian Religion. This, however, is not intended as a disparagement of the science of Comparative Religion. Examples of *metanoia* and saintliness could as well be taken from Mohametanism or Buddhism. The results obtained no doubt differ but the process of Religion as an experience is in no way different. It would be interesting to push our investigations into an examination of the psychology developed along with Buddhism and the Yogi philosophy of Hinduism. There is a field of research open, also, to anyone who will classify the various expressions of religious emotions in the lower orders of human society and examine the ideas which give them vitality and potency. The greatest part of the service which psychology can give to a philosophy of religion and a proof of the existence of the Object of Religion is yet to be ren-

dered, but it is gratifying to see that the tendency of thought at present is to compel this branch of science to render its full tale of service. And this tendency is in line with a return to experience as a basis of knowledge in Religion as in other affairs. In this connection Professor James says:¹ "The inner state is our very experience itself; its reality and that of our experience are one. A conscious field *plus* its object as felt or thought of *plus* an attitude towards the object *plus* the sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs — such a concrete bit of personal experience may be a small bit, but it is a solid bit as long as it lasts; not hollow, not a mere abstract element of experience, such as the object is when taken alone." By object he means the object of science:² "To describe the world with all the various feelings of the individual pinch of destiny, all the various spiritual attitudes, left out from the description — they being as describable as anything else — would be something like offering a printed bill of fare as the equivalent of a solid meal." Religion makes no such blunder.

Monism. — It is this recognition of the totality of experience which we hail as hopeful. The totality and oneness of reality appeals to us. There are advantages in taking isolated objects and viewing them in their isolation as though they contained finality, but such piece work is unreasonable if it has not in view the relations of the object even in the completest possible isolation. It is this very completeness, this most perfectness of being which the Ontological concept constantly holds before us. Thus Religious Experience is the door through which life enters into the knowledge of this most perfect temple of reality.

III.

EXPERIENCE AS KNOWLEDGE.

Anselm adopted the principle "*credo ut intelligam*." This precept contains an appreciation and a protest. It does not sever Religion and knowledge as Scepticism and Transcendental Ideal-

¹ James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 498.

² James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 500.

ism do and it does not accept blindly the ecclesiastical "*credo quia absurdum*." The protest consists in an admitted restlessness under faith as a finality. Experience which includes faith has as its goal knowledge. Religion cannot be satisfactorily tied to an isolated faculty of a trinal facultied soul. It is not "a feeling of absolute dependence" alone and it is not "the will to live" alone much less is it "knowledge" in the Hegelian sense. Any attempt at a definition¹ along these lines must prove abortive. The entire being is a unit in a religious state. But this is not to deny that there is a religious function in each of the faculties of the mind taken individually. The contention of Abelard for the thesis "*Ratio præcedit fidem*" was intended to free reason from the bondage of tradition. To the extent that this bondage was real the work of Abelard was valuable, but the reaction which he introduced soon passed to the other extreme of Rationalism. One of these extremes is as bad as the other. To be sure irrational tradition must be excluded. At the same time no intelligent philosophy of life can be constructed which severs rational from sensible experience. I have all along interpreted Anselm's method as a natural method of proceeding from experience to knowledge. He discovered the identity of the idea of God in the intellect with the God of faith in experience. To deny one would be to doubt the other and to doubt consciousness is impossible.

There are two very significant verifications of Anselm's method which remain to be noticed. In the first place it harmonizes with the fact of historic revelation and in the second place it serves as a regulative to Mysticism. We have two great human phenomena one a fact and the other a theory confronting and antagonizing each other. Mysticism has had a wide currency both in ancient and in modern times. It has doubtless exercised a more or less wholesome influence on the development of Religion but its claims are out of harmony with the facts of history. Its root is likely to be found in those floods of enthusiasm which we have had occasion to notice in the last chapter. Let us again postpone its discussion until we have given more consideration to Historic Revelation and Enthusiasm.

¹ Caird, "*Int. Phil. Rel.*"

Revelation.—Every Religion has a history. It must be admitted, however, that the sacred books of no other Religion can be compared with the sacred books of Christianity and Judaism in their identification of the revelation of the Object of Religion with the historic development of a nation and an individual. Take the life of Jesus and the history of Israel out of the Old and the New Testament and there remains a chaos. Buddha was an enlightened one who pointed out the eightfold path, the Vedas contain the principles of a philosophy, theogonies and ethical teachings are found in other sacred writings, but Christianity is a life and a history. Lessing was one of the first to draw attention to this fact in his *Education of the Human Race* and its importance has been magnified along with the development theory of history. Historical revelation goes along with the historical development of Religion. It is accumulated experience on the spiritual side of life.

Such a theory of Revelation is verified by Psychology. A revelation in whatever way it is given must be received by the understanding and the understanding is limited by time, space and the categories. Whatever truths are received or communicated are subject to these forms. Neither does experience ever deny them and for this reason a revelation or a theory of revelation which is conformable to experience is most acceptable. Let us see how this applies in the examination of *enthusiasm*.

Enthusiasm.—When we pass to the method of Revelations, the claims of experience take a manifold form. I use the word *Enthusiasm* in its etymological sense as broader than the theological term Inspiration. It signifies all that could be determined by the expression God-consciousness. A confused multitude of arahats, mahatmas, mediums, pythons, seers and witches rush to our imagination at the mention of these terms. Unless it is intended to abandon our search we must at this point again turn to psychology for a guiding hand. The reproach of the blatant atheist that all these creatures have experiences is immediately upon us. And it is unquestionably a fact that religions best and worst have not despised this fellowship. Visions, dreams, ecstatic states, epileptic fits, intoxications and all kindred psychical phenomena have been

used by religiously disposed persons as a means of getting into contact with the unseen world. All sacred books and many sacred performances bear witness to these statements. And it is having fellowship of this character which gives some ground to those who class Religion with other manifestations of degeneration. How are we to meet the scoffs of those who make such charges? Certainly neither with a denial nor an apology.

In the first place putting aside the objectionable features of such manifestations of Religion we hold to their positive content. They bear witness to the presence of religious emotions and ideas. "He that cometh unto God must believe that he is." All of these efforts to get into contact with the spirit world are direct evidence of a belief in that world. The best answer, by way of illustration, to those who deny that the Israelites believed in immortality is the story of the Witch of Endor. Such a bit of folk-lore outweighs volumes of doctrine. And all those objectionable features such as necromancy, witchcraft and frenzy, possess such a kernel of veritable experience. They represent crude methods by which the idea seeks to fulfil its purpose by finding its Object.

Methods of Enthusiasm.—Perhaps it will not be amiss to examine some of these methods. *The dream* is no doubt the earliest mediumistic process. The Hebrew Sacred writings are true to nature in putting this method of revelation in its historic place as primitive. Abraham, Jacob and Pharaoh received revelations in dreams and Joseph achieved a reputation for wisdom as a dream interpreter. In this respect the Israelites were not singular. I mention them because they incorporate this method of revelation in its historic place. But even Paul, a cultured religious spirit, did not despise the gate of dreams as a means of access to the spirit world.

Dreams, however, do not offer a sufficiently pliant means of *enthusiasm*. A revelation is needed for a certain time and the dream power cannot be depended upon to furnish it. There were other methods early discovered by which religiously disposed minds sought to extend the limits of consciousness. One of these means was the use of intoxicants. The deification of *Soma* and

Bacchus and the fact that Israelitish prophets¹ were open to the reproach that they prophesied through wine can scarcely be interpreted in any other way than as an effort to obtain a revelation by stimulation.

As a third method the *mediumistic trance* or ecstasy might be mentioned. The story of Balaam furnishes a primitive example. The means used in that particular case are not recorded but numerous devices are well known by which the mind can be physically transported. Weird music, dizziness produced by over-violent exercises as well as conscious control over rational consciousness, are known to accomplish the desired effects. The Yogi of India have worked these processes out experimentally and have developed along with them a valuable psychological philosophy. Together with these experiences epileptoid phenomena are to be classed and possibly all pathological experiences.

So much then for the facts. Any treatise on Anthropology would add to them indefinitely. That they produce much spurious and self-contradictory material is certain. Nevertheless they belong to a sum total of world experience and cannot be indolently swept into the abyss.

What then has psychology to say of these experiences and this matter of fact? The first thing that must strike one in attending to these phenomena is that they all express an effort to extend the limits of ordinary consciousness. The temptation to do this is involved in dream and trance experiences. The development of experience proves that the same effects are obtainable in other ways, and this discovery having once been made the mind reasonably attempts to make use of it in self-directed attempts to transcend barriers which stand as present obstacles. The senses do not discover to consciousness all of reality. If by way of illustration, we adopt a vibratory theory of perception and suppose that each of the senses run a certain gamut, it is a pure matter of physics to demonstrate that there are gaps between the gamuts of the senses. Sight is blind to certain light waves and hearing is deaf to certain sound waves. Thus for purely physical perception

¹ Micah 2: 11.

consciousness is incomplete. Nothing could be more evident than that reality is larger and richer than consciousness, and any attempt to enlarge experience is, therefore, justifiable however irrational it may be in method.

We must turn to specialists in the field of Psychology for a verification of this last statement. The subliminal region of consciousness cannot be ignored. Too many well-authenticated facts of experience arise in that region to forbid its being indifferently passed by. "It¹ is the abode of everything that is latent and the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded and unobserved. It contains, for example, such things as all our momentarily active memories, and it harbors the springs of all our obscurely motivated passions, impulses, likes, dislikes and prejudices. Our intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, convictions and in general all our nonrational operations come from it. It is the source of our dreams and apparently they may return to it. In it arises whatever mystical experiences we may have, etc." Thus Professor James describes the subconscious self. The entire subject is more fully discussed in the recent work by Professor F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*. It is sufficient to say that the light of Psychology has served to verify the anticipations of Religion. In other words, Religion has not followed a phantom when its idea seeks to verify its Object. Its instinct at least was true in seeking in the subconscious regions of self for the intermediary or nexus between self and God. The discovery of the existence of the subconscious self belongs to the last twenty years, and the scientific observation of its facts is still in its infancy but so far its verifications are by no means subversive of what religious experiences have established.

Tests of Enthusiasm. — To revert now to the somewhat disreputable collection of enthusiasts mentioned in this section, the question may be asked: If psychology accredits the phenomena of dreams, trances, visions and such like unrational phenomena, what clue can be taken to discern the true from the false and the

¹ James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 483.

valuable from the worthless? This is an important question in the development of the relation between experience and the Ontological idea. The religious life would simply be deluged if every dream and figment of a fevered brain were accepted as authoritative in rational life. Here, however, the pressure of the limitations of life serve a regulative purpose. Only those communications with the supersensuous world which aid in transcending limitations are valuable. They alone are accredited by truth. In other words, rational experience verifies the message of the prophets. Lying spirits are distinguished from true spirits by the event. In the remarkable tradition of Micaiah¹ and the four hundred prophets there was no recourse but to wait for the issue. *Truth* and *value* thus come to be the tests of enthusiasm. There is an analogy in the opening of the combination lock. The mind which sets the combination has a purpose and the person who opens the lock must arrive at the purpose of the other mind. This analogy at the same time is unfortunate for the reason that the purpose in the combination is intentionally obscure while the purpose of life is sympathetic and the seeker after the Object of Religion is consciously rewarded by each turn in the right direction.

In these two ideas there are to be found the motive and corrective of Enthusiasm. In the first place there is *the broad reality* which sensibility only partially discovers and experience is always bearing witness, through various phenomena, that a subconscious contact with this reality beyond the sensuous contact is possible. The forms of enthusiasm represent developments of these subconscious methods. And in the second place *truth* and *value* serve as regulative principles which correct the extravagances of enthusiasm. The understanding is under a constant temptation to break away from the forms — time, space and the categories — which its nature imposes as the true method of experience. This temptation is pressed by the subconscious self and the successes of Religion in discovering a content for the Idea of God give to it a certain amount of strength.

¹ 1 Kings, 22.

Mysticism.—It is a remarkable fact that the Founder of Christianity did not make use of any of the methods of enthusiasm. Dreams, theophanies, epileptic fits and *metanoia* have no place in his experience. The nearest approach to any of these processes is to be found in the accounts of His Baptism and Transfiguration, and of these He does not make mention in His teaching. The reason for this difference from other religious teachers is to be found in the peculiar claims of Jesus. His conscious relation to the Object of Religion was such that any method of communication would have been an interference. His life *was* a union with and revelation of the Father. The relation was such that He could truly say I and the Father are one.

This relation has ever been the ideal aim of Mysticism. As a theory of knowledge mysticism magnifies intuition. It endeavors to come into direct contact with reality. The senses are condemned because of their errors and deceptions. The true method of knowledge is to know God and through him to know his works. The tempting possibilities of enthusiasm have given encouragement to Mysticism. This, no doubt, accounts for its appearance in so many widely separated centers of thought. It is not necessary to the development of our theme to enter into a detailed account of its methods and usefulness. Its weakness is its unnaturalness. It does violence to the progressive method of revelation both in life and in history. To know reality entirely and immediately and then, being creatures of the forms of thought, to fill in afterward the details of experience would be to overturn all that is intelligible in human life.

The Ontological Proof by giving due place to experience serves as a corrective to mysticism. No exponent of the *a priori* method would claim that the Ontological Idea is an intuitive apprehension of the most perfect being. It is an Idea related to experience and to which experience furnishes a content.

Buddhism.—There are two remarks which appear to be appropriate to our examination of *Enthusiasm*. The first is in reference to Buddhism.¹ It was certainly a profound observation which

¹ Rhys-Davids, "Buddhism," p. 120.

led the author of that Religion in constructing the Wheel of Life to place the Sankharas between ignorance and consciousness. The *confection*, the putting together, must precede the consciousness. But on the other hand Buddhism lacks that conception of a *continuum* which Kant used with such good effect in the phenomenal world. In our conception the Sankharas or the confection bound together in a *continuum* is the subconscious self from which consciousness springs.

The Social Consciousness. — The other remark is concerning the social consciousness. There is little hope of working out a consistent theory of any form of this phenomena, until some better Philosophy of the Unconscious has been worked out. Social scientists up to this time have accepted a social consciousness as a fact and have built upon it in a more or less unsatisfactory way, but its essence has not yet been sufficiently discovered. The work of psychologists in entering the subconscious precincts of the soul, whether we call this region the Sankharas with Buddha or the Oversoul with Emerson, is the most hopeful effort that has been made to build up a science of social self-consciousness.

The God-Idea. — The ground of religious experience has now been sufficiently traversed to allow us to introduce the process of the unfolding of the God-idea. We have found that this idea stands over against experience *in toto* and that its purpose acts as a mediator between the facts of experience and the infinite beyond. Like the dove sent out of the ark it finds no place to rest. It searches in the realm of material things and finds some objects and events which are true and valuable for the conscious self but each of these objects and events lacks permanence and finality.¹ Therefore at some stage of religious history the mind becomes introspective in its search for a fulfilment of its ontological purpose. Various kinds of revelations were brought to light from the conscious and subliminal regions of the mind. It does not matter whether revelations were derived from dreams, intoxications, auto-intoxications or the Holy Spirit, they had to come to men as experiences and were necessarily subject to the forms of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 121.

thought. It was also necessary to subject all revelations to the tests of truth and value. The process of unfolding the God-idea was a process of building up experience according to the rule and plummet of these two tests. It is only necessary to arrive at a true history of Religion to reach a description of this process. Two or three things may be found on the surface. In the first place the concept of material helpfulness is everywhere first apparent. In fact many religious lives never pass beyond that thought of God. The supreme being is God Almighty. As the conception of the worth of knowledge reveals the preciousness of wisdom, it is added, and the all-wise God is worshiped. It was not in vain that religiously-disposed persons sought by fasting to come into contact with the spirit world, for their devotion and self-sacrifice gave prominence to the internal values of life. They brought the virtues into distinction and in this way the ethical content of the Ontological Idea was supplied. The conception of a Good God cannot be surpassed but it requires an ever-deepening experience to analyze its significance. Such expressions as God is a spirit, God is truth and God is love are necessarily final. The last and highest revelation of God which Judaism endeavored to utter and Jesus express by his life is union with humanity, and into this helpful and blessed relationship all souls are freely invited to enter. The Father was in Jesus and He is also in all those who receive Jesus in a real experience.

What I have said is not intended as a denial of a supernatural revelation. It is an assertion of it. It is not intended to deny that some souls have had a greater endowment with the Holy Ghost than others. It is, however, intended that these experiences should be included with other religious experiences. It would also be claimed, that all religious experiences are accompanied by definite psychological processes. But the heart of our contention is that every religious experience has been accompanied by the form of the Ontological Idea and that the will of this Idea has served a constructive purpose.

PART III.

THE IDEA OF GOD AND ETHICS.

I.

ETHICAL PRINCIPLES.

Methods. — “Whether the treatment of that class of knowledge with which reason is occupied follows the secure method of a science or not, can easily be determined by the result. If, after repeated preparation, it comes to a standstill, as soon as its real goal is approached, or is obliged, in order to reach it, to retrace its steps again and again, and strike into fresh paths; again, if it is impossible to produce unanimity among those who are engaged in the same work, as to the manner in which their common object should be obtained, we may be convinced that such a study is far from having attained to the secure method of a science, but is groping only in the dark.”¹ These words with which Kant began the preface to the second edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, come to our memory very forcibly as we enter the field of ethics. Standing along with Religion in the border land of physics and metaphysics this field has been the scene of much fierce controversy. If we begin by defining Ethics as “the science of conduct,”² the way might appear to be clear enough; but conduct or “all moral action” as Aristotle says, “that is all purpose — would seem to aim at some good result.”³ In other words conduct is traceable to character and character to self and self to being or reality. The Agnostic thereupon appears who knows nothing of Reality and ignores all but the facts of conduct. For him Ethics

¹ Kant, “*Critique of Pure Reason*.” Max Müller trans., p. 688.

² Seth, “*Ethical Principles*.”

³ Aristotle, “*Nic. Ethics*,” p. 1.

is simply a science which treats of man as a part of nature. On the other hand the Kantian transcendentalist appears who classifies the moral agent in the phenomenal world but asserts that his freedom belongs to the intelligible world. And in the third place the Hegelian transcendentalist asserts "the entire immanence of God in the process of the universe."¹ With three such extremes the prospect of peace is not visible. Thus it has ever been in the field of Ethics. Treatises on Types of Ethical Theory, Problems of Conduct and Methods of Ethics are necessary to clear the ground. With these facts before us it is certainly evident that "the sure method of a science" of Ethics has not yet been discovered.

Our interest in this class of discussions arises from the close relation which Ethics bears to Religion. To be sure the Positivist who ignores the idea of God as a norm of ethics will deny this relation, but we have an unanswerable reply to his denial in the facts of history. It is the purpose of this concluding part of our thesis to show that the Ontological Idea in its practical significance offers a dynamic to Ethics.²

We have already accepted the challenge of the scientist. When he demanded that we should be guided by experience we acceded to his demands but required that the sum total of experience shall be included. Our examination of religious experience as discovered by anthropology and tested by psychology revealed that the concept of God has a vital content. We must now subject the facts of Ethics from which the Positivist would construct his science to the same examination. The same analysis of the content of consciousness, to which the Ontological proof directed our attention at first, will continue to serve as a guiding principle and we use it with the greater confidence since it has already given us so much help in the examination of religious experience. Before we enter upon this examination, however, it may be well to remind ourselves that the Problem of Ethics is "the interpretation of our

¹ Seth, "Ethical Principles," p. 390.

² Martineau, "Study of Religion," 1: 16; Flint, "Theism," p. 242; also Müller's "Natural Religion," p. 170.

judgments of ethical value.”¹ We are also concerned with Aristotle’s identification of moral action with purpose. In other words, there is an intention inseparably connected with every moral act. These two facts then, the purpose of action and our judgment upon the action with its purpose, are at the root of the Problem of Ethics.

The discovery of a purpose at the heart of every moral act cannot fail to remind us of the intention of ideas which we met with in the analysis of consciousness. Neither do we forget that the purpose of the Ontological Idea is to seek its Other in a concretely embodied life. Here is a purpose, then, which must express itself in action, in action directed toward a definite end, and here stands ethical conduct on the other hand, as action directed toward a definite end, which must be joined with, and judged by its purpose. What would hinder our identifying these two purposes? The fact that this question arises is the reason for our extending our search for the practical content of the Ontological Proof to the field of ethics. The quest of the Ontological Idea for its Other or in the language of Religion the heart’s quest for God is a mighty quest. Let us not suppose that the purpose of an idea because it is transcendental must therefore be weak and despised. We have but to pause for a moment and remember the constructive power of ideas to convince ourselves that we are not speaking of mere figments of the imagination. The Idea of God leading and compelling men through its purpose has given the world its Religion with all that this significant word includes. And it is the contention of this thesis that the same purpose of the same idea is the motive of ethical action. It does not matter whether I ask with Kant² “What ought I to do?” or whether I say with Aristotle “At what shall I aim?” whether I make doing or being, conduct or character the chief end of life, this purpose is at the heart of it all. Aristotle said of the supreme good — “Surely then a scientific knowledge of it will have a critical influence upon our lives, and will make us, like bowmen who have a mark at which to aim, all

¹ Seth, “Ethical Principles,” p. 37.

² Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason,” p. 646.

the more likely to hit upon that which is our good.”¹ If this is true concerning the supreme good by how much more is it true concerning God and if it can be shown that the course of human actions has been changed by the force of their Idea of God we have thus found an additional content for the Ontological Idea.

By the purpose of an idea I mean that which redeems it from chaos. A chord of music, this pen with which I write, or a human being is an embodied purpose and without the purpose there would be no idea involved in them. When we speak, therefore, of the purpose of the Ontological Idea we mean that which renders it self-consistent and intelligible. In this particular case the purpose is perfection which we think of as the greatest conceivable. This perfection varies subjectively with the mind which conceives it but it has a progressive definiteness. It involves a grasp of the content of the Object of which it is an idea and a reaction upon the individual to whom the idea belongs. For this reason we devoted the second part of this thesis to an examination of the religious emotions as elements of conscious experience and unfolded their relation to the Object of Religion. This constitutes the subjective aspect of our subject. But a purpose as an active principle compels expression and Religion, therefore, must have, as it is well known it does have, an objective aspect which I would call the ethical function of Religion. It is the purpose of the Ontological Idea to mould the individual and social life into harmony with its anticipation of the Object of Religion. In the language of every-day life Ethics is the effect of the knowledge of God in the moral life of men. In fact we have drawn near to Max Müller’s theory,² that “religion consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man.” Our position differs from this, in holding that the Infinite is an Idea which embraces the perception of finite objects, but we agree with the contention that it influences the moral character.

Relation to Science and Religion.—In the first place, then, the matter of fact of conduct belongs to experience. As matter of

¹ Aristotle, “Nic. Ethics,” p. 2, trans. Williams.

² Müller, “Natural Religion,” p. 188.

fact it constitutes the subject matter of a science. In so far it is proper to speak of the science of Ethics rather than the metaphysics of Ethics. The facts of Ethics also belong to the events of history and as such the genetic method of treatment is applicable to them. On the other hand it is necessary to subject the facts which science gathers and systematizes, in a qualitative manner. Their relation to other facts in a sum total of life experiences have to be assigned, and at this point we pass beyond the mere *that* of ethical experience and begin to inquire for the *what*. In this process we discover two relations which any genetic theory of Ethics must reveal. The first is that Ethics has grown up with and sprung from Religion. In other words, that there is an intimate connection between character and conduct and the religious functions of life. And in the second place, since conduct springs from character, and character belongs to self or a self-conscious being, the facts of Ethics must be subjected to a psychological treatment. Let us look first at the religious relation.

Anthropology. — It is necessary to turn to anthropology for a proof of the relation of Religion to morality. For historical reasons we cannot accept Kant's assertion that "amongst all the public religions that have ever existed the Christian alone is moral."¹ The fact is that in primitive culture Religion and morality have developed together. The conceptions which different races of mankind have held of the Object of Religion in different stages of their civilization are distinctly reflected in the individual and social character and conduct of their people. Make a sufficient deduction for the influence of nature as an environment on the character of the inhabitants of a given district and there still remains an overplus of influence arising from the fact of nature worship. The culture of Greece, the sanguinary forcefulness of the Norse and the contemplative disposition of the Hindu each reflect the environment which worked itself into their Ontological Idea. There are in the peoples of each of these nations certain features, decidedly unmoral, which are to be accounted for by the incompleteness of the Theogonic process; but these facts

¹ Abbott, "Kant's Theory of Ethics," p. 360.

do not conceal from us the moral influences of their Religion. In the next place it is to be noticed that races, which continue to hold animistic conceptions, fail to reveal elevated standards of morality; while, those races which have adopted mythical interpretations of the forces of nature, arriving at an anthropomorphic polytheism or pantheism, have made greater progress in moral culture. And where materialistic religions have given way either to a psychological religion such as Buddhism or spiritual Henotheism as in Judaism and Christianity, the highest stages of ethical culture have been attained. A God of righteousness or an Holy Father, when represented in the Ontological Idea, does, as a matter of fact, influence the character and conduct of the people who hold such an ideal.

These statements though exceedingly general seem to me sufficient to establish the assertion that Religion influences the moral character of the human race. The Ontological Idea has constantly served as a constructive principle in Ethics. This is the thesis which Kant has worked out elaborately in his Theory of Ethics. There is, however, a limitation to the ethical force of nature religions. In whatever stage of culture we find them they are more or less necessitarian. The Animist is at the mercy of spirits with which his mind has peopled nature. They act in him and outside of him as representatives of every helping or hindering force. Such a view of life leaves little place for free moral action. Cunning and courage are about the only practical virtues worth developing in connection with animistic religion. On the other hand, when we turn to a more fully developed Polytheism or Pantheism, fate immediately confronts us. The gods as well as men in the Greek mythology were subject to the three sisters at the loom. A like necessity ruled the gods of the Norse mythology. And if this is true for Polytheism it is much more true for Pantheism. Whether we look at this system as a religion or a philosophy it is essentially fatalistic. The individual is held fast in a relentless mechanism, which destroys all distinction between nature and character, what is and what ought to be, and to that extent an ethic for the Pantheist is impossible. He cannot sever

responsibility and liberty in an ethical idea of life. It must be admitted, if we follow up the process, that Theism, Deism and materialism are in a like manner fatalistic. It does not matter whether the moral agent is the product of heredity and environment or a part of a system governed by the law of a *Deus ex machina* or only a predestined individual, his liberty is denied and to that extent he ceases to be responsible. It is a fact, however, that ethical culture has proceeded under all these philosophic and religious systems but it has proceeded in spite of them and not by their aid. It has proceeded because of the subconscious processes and beliefs, which frequently assert their power, when conscious reason fails to wisely execute its function. And this fact, has no doubt given cause for the endeavor to separate Religion and Ethics. Genetic Ethics, however, will ever warn us against such a division.

For purposes of thought it would be very convenient to assign to Religion the reflective functions of life and allow Ethics to have complete possession of the field of moral action. This division would isolate the two sciences and prevent their conflicting in any way. So far as the facts of Ethics are concerned no objection to this division could be raised, but a difficulty appears, so soon as we begin to look at the quality of ethical acts and judgments. When this is done a *norm* or *standard* of judgments is demanded and it becomes necessary to enter the meditative precincts of the soul. It is true, on the other hand, that, when we think of the origin of Religion, our attention is more occupied with the emotions and their relation to the Idea of God, which the mind sustains linked with them, but a merely internal Religion would be fruitless. The religious emotions from their very nature must express themselves. The purpose of their idea is an active energizing purpose. It must express itself in a living embodiment of activity. This is to say that the activity of life which springs from religious emotions and ideas belongs as truly to Religion as the inner contemplation of the soul's relation to God. Religion, therefore, comprehends both the inner state, which represents the limited self sustaining a certain relation to the most perfect being, and the activity by which the self seeks to consum-

mate that relation. The activity, however, being purposive, is included by science in the sphere of Ethics, but in no case is it able to stand alone. On the contemplative side of Religion we are concerned with the purpose of the idea and on the active or ethical side we have the same concern with the will of the deed. It is the will or intention which redeems both the idea and the act from chaos.

Psychology. — The second requirement of a genetic treatment of Ethics is psychological. Moral acts are originated, regulated, and governed by the soul. It was very proper therefore of David Hume when he attempted to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects to call his work a *Treatise of Human Nature*. His method of proceeding from the origin of ideas and their composition to the Passions and thence to Morals is highly instructive. This method, however, of connecting morals with Human Nature was as old as the ancients,¹ only it had not been so completely worked out before. Neither did Hume work out the problem satisfactorily, valuable as his contribution of the empirical study of ethics has been, modern psychology has succeeded in presenting a better representation of Human Nature. And to this extent it has given a powerful impulse to the *appreciative* as opposed to the *descriptive* study of ethics.²

In its psychological relation Ethics has followed a parallel with Religion. I mean by this statement that the historical theories of Ethics have connected themselves with one or other mental faculty. The *Socratic Theory* that right knowing involves right doing has appeared again and again and plainly connects itself with the knowledge faculty or the intellect. *Hedonism* whether taken in its Epicurean form or as stated by Bentham, Mill and their successors is an exaltation of feeling and belongs to the sense function. And last of all the will faculty is represented by *Stoicism* which is sometimes theistic and sometimes atheistic. In order to avoid the necessary incompleteness of such ethical functioning efforts have been made to combine two faculties under one

¹ Seth, "Ethical Principles," p. 39.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

theory. Thus Hedonism, which in its bald form of self-seeking does not seem to leave any room for disinterested action, is helped over the difficulty by subsidizing the intellect, the feelings alone having no ability to construct a canon of consequences. The fact of altruism is admitted both in the individual and in society, but it is admitted as a disguised egoism, intelligence having revealed that present suffering for others buys future rewards. Stoicism also seeks an alliance with intelligence. Kant is the classic representative of this combination.¹ In his Theory of Ethics he hits upon *the good will* as the only good thing in the world but he worked out his marvellous theory of knowledge as a preface to the question "What ought I to do?" And the good will is placed under the direction of the Pure Practical Reason.

Actions are of two kinds, either impulsive or purposive. Impulsive action is the reaction of the sensorium upon an impression, purposive is linked with ideas. We can say that a human being is responsible for impulsive action only to the extent that he is responsible to transform what he is by nature into a character. Impulsive action is altogether or nearly immediate. Purposive action on the other hand is reflective, indicates choice and reveals character. It connects therefore with the faculties of the soul and at the same time calls attention to a norm of judgment which gives it color or character. Out of the manifold of possible actions it fixes upon one and makes it real. In observing the relation of purposive action to the soul we are led to remark that psychology has done for Ethics precisely the same that it has done for Religion. It has shown the futility of every attempt to function Ethics in any way just as it has shown that Religion is not to be tied to one particular faculty. The will for example is not to be taken in isolation. In the act of choice, elements of knowledge and feeling are present and a feeling is nothing without the ideas and preferences which hold it in solution. Every part of an individual's being participates in his ethical act. It is true, that, at one stage or another of the act, one or other faculty predominates, but even this is difficult to determine. In making a choice, for

¹ Kant's "Theory of Ethics," Abbott, p. 9.

example, there is the thought of the object of choice, together with the desirable and undesirable relations of that choice, which are the feelings of anticipation pleasant or unpleasant, held in representation, and finally there is the predominance, which constitutes the acceptance or rejection of the object. All this is accompanied by what may be described as a wave motion in the psychical process. But in this entire composite representation what would be described as the supreme function? Like the three brothers in the Arabian tale, one has the medicine, another has the seeing glass, and the third has the transporting carpet. Who shall say which saved the dying father?

It does not help this method of connecting a theory of Ethics with a faculty, if one of the faculties is made *intuitional*. A theory of Conscience, is, no doubt, to be expected, in connection with what we have already said concerning enthusiasm; for the success of Religion in finding God lends encouragement to the hope of an intuitive apprehension of the good and the bad. But our conclusion under that topic was that intuition apart from experience is full of vagaries. Truth and value must serve as its tests. Any attempt, therefore to extend the powers of the knowing faculty, as is done in intuitional ethics, cannot be differentiated from Religion. Any discovery of the good or the bad in the abstract, by a peculiar faculty of the mind known as conscience, or the Moral Sense, is just as hopeless, as the Hedonistic attempt to discover good and evil by means of the sense faculty; and Hedonism has the advantage of an appeal to experience.

Norms.—What we have said of the theories of Ethics, connected with the various psychical functions, has already served to indicate the various norms by which ethical judgments are regulated. Rational systems find some law either discovered in a revealed will of God, or developed in the evolution of society, or the categorical imperative of Pure Practical Reason. The norm of sensational ethics is pleasure, either the happiness of the individual or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. And last of all the standard of the volitionalist is value. But, our psychological examination of the process of functioning Ethics revealed, that

neither of these theories is capable of standing alone; and, if in isolation, they are insufficient to account for the facts of experience, their norm of moral judgments must be rejected. So long as one or the other of these ethical theories, in their various developments, try to give an account of conduct, we must expect the field of ethics to continue to serve as a battlefield. A moral act is neither purely rational, nor purely volitional, much less, is its entire reference, present or future, mere happiness. It is neither to be judged, in any final way, by a law which would show it to be right or wrong, nor by pleasure which serves as its index, nor by its value. Either of these norms alone and all of them synthesized do not furnish a sufficient ground for all ethical judgments. On the other hand our theory, and, I may add, the Gospel of Christianity, finds the true norm of conduct in a life, a living unity with the Father. It is true that the teachings of Jesus represent the Will of the Father as the law of the Kingdom of Heaven, nevertheless, that will is not a *heteronomous* will but an *autonomous* relation of the soul of the believer to his God. This idea of moral judgments, and this alone, agrees with what our study of the Ontological proof has led us to conceive of the relation of life to the Most Perfect Being.

II.

THE ONTOLOGICAL METHOD OF ETHICS.

Metaphysics.—It is now time to define our attitude toward *metaphysics*. We have avoided the use of this term because of the implication of dualism contained in it. The living relation of the seen and the unseen of the sensible and the intelligible, is destroyed by sundering even in thought the physical and the metaphysical. The course of our discussion must have revealed that we accept mental and physical phenomena alike as real. There is no reality isolated from what is known in experience. There is indeed an infinite manifold of reality which experience has not comprehended, but it is not in any sense severed or isolated from what is apprehended. No particle of reality is known either in

its infinite or its infinitesimal relations, nevertheless, some particles are known relatively and they connect with what is not known. The soul and God are not known fully and never can be so known by a finite understanding but they are known in part, and a God other than the God of experience does not exist. If then by metaphysical we mean all that our senses are incapable of apprehending of reality I do not object to the term so long as it sets no limits to the possibility of experience.

Again ideas belong to the totality of reality. They are not to be severed from sensible reality for the real cannot exist without them. They constitute the intention of things and hold the same purpose in themselves which they embody in things. It is the identity of the purpose in the object and in the idea which renders knowledge possible.

Our third position is that an event as well as a thing may embody a purpose. Events without purpose are accidents. Events embodying purposes are rational acts. Under this head then all moral actions are to be included. The cognitive power of the soul by means of attention combines events which would otherwise pass without a meaning. Intelligent choice consists in holding attention by means of ideas to those objects of choice which will advance the best interests of life. The supreme or regulative purpose is the will of the Ontological Idea and a life is moral or immoral according to the conduct of the individual under the guidance of this supreme purpose.

Kant. — It is necessary at this point to examine the transcendental Theory of Ethics proposed by Immanuel Kant. The weakness of his theory of knowledge is nowhere more apparent than in his Ethics. It introduces the impossible situation of a man's conscious life entirely shut up to the sensible world and as such subject to the necessity of natural law, at the same time receiving a categorical imperative — a moral law — from the intelligible world in which his liberty has its abode. It is not remarkable when we consider this situation that he began by saying: "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it,

¹ Kant, "Theory of Ethics," trans. by Abbott, p. 9.

which can be called good without qualification, except a good Will," and concluded with a discussion "on the radical evil in human nature."¹ "The good will is good not because of what it performs or effects . . . but simply by virtue of the volition, *it is good in itself.*" It has an absolute value. "Duty" is defined as "the necessity of acting from respect for the law."² And "an action done from duty derives its moral worth, *not from the purpose which is to be attained* by it but from the maxim by which it is determined." The stoicism revealed in these quotations is obtrusive, but we are reminded of Lotze's remark that "an unconditioned *should* or *ought to be* is unthinkable."³

The second important point in Kant's theory is "that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely *a priori* in the reason."⁴ It is their pure origin which gives them worth and renders it important to exclude everything empirical from them. With this point in view he proceeded to deduce the Categorical Imperative which must be derived from the general concept of a rational being. The moral law, thus derived, differs from all natural laws and "the idea of it, which determines the will, is distinct from all the principles that determine events in nature according to the law of causality, because in their case the determining principles must themselves be phenomena,"⁵ and since this is true the will, determined by such an universal legislative form, must be free from the law of causality. "Such independence is called freedom." Of the three concepts *God*, *freedom* and *immortality*, the second alone is proved by the apodictic law of practical reason. The possibility of the other two is to be proved by the fact that freedom actually exists.

By the discovery of the categorical imperative in the pure practical reason Kant arrived at the principle of *autonomy*. The will's independence of all matter of the law, as a desired object, constitutes freedom in the negative sense; but *autonomy* or self

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³ Lotze, "Philosophy of Religion," p. 157.

⁴ Kant, "Theory of Ethics," p. 28.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

legislation is freedom in a positive sense.¹ On the other hand all *heteronomous* theories are opposed to the morality of the will.

Kant identified the moral law as a *law of Holiness* with the will of God as a perfect being. It thus represents the one point of contact between the phenomenal and real world. The existence of God, however, is still only a postulate, and if the commands of the moral law are to be realized in any way the existence of God and the reality of immortality must be postulated.

The discussion on *the Indwelling of the Bad Principle along with the Good* discovered the fact of radical evil in human nature. Man is either morally good or bad, he cannot be partly one and partly the other. There is an original capacity for good along with the propensity to evil in human nature, but the fact that the propensity to evil belongs to man universally proves it to be an acquired capacity. "The capability or incapability of the elective will to adopt the moral law into its maxims or not, arising from this natural propensity, is called *a good or a bad heart*."² And the degrees of badness conceivable are to be termed *frailty, impurity* and *depravity*. Frailty accepts the ideal conception of the moral law but is too weak to resist sensuous inclinations. Impurity does not adopt the law alone as its sufficient motive but makes use of other means to determine the elective will to duty. And depravity prefers other springs to the dynamic of the moral law.

There remains to be considered "the restoration of the original capacity for good to its full power."³ Kant takes the position that "what man is or ought to be he must make or must have made himself." The hope of the restoration he finds in the categorical imperative. The respect for the moral law can never be lost, therefore all that is necessary is the restoration of its purity as self-sufficient. When it is thus restored by the elective will the one who has adopted it is on the way to holiness *by an endless progress*. Virtue is thus gradually acquired. From these obser-

¹ Kant, "Theory of Ethics," p. 122.

² Kant, "Theory of Ethics," p. 336.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 352.

vations the conclusion is drawn that "the moral culture of a man must begin with the *transformation of a mind* and the foundation of character.¹ The moral capacity in us we cannot cease to regard with the highest astonishment, it proclaims a divine origin and must arouse the spirit to enthusiasm.³ If the moral law commands that we *shall* now be better men, it follows inevitably that we also *can* be better.

Christian Ethics. — This selection of quotations from the Theory of Ethics is sufficient to reveal the general features of the Kantian theory and at the same time manifest its points of likeness to and difference from our own theory. The fact that Kant appealed to the *a priori* method to establish the moral law furnishes at least a point of contact with the same method when used to prove the existence of a most perfect being. The difference, however, is in that the moral law is but one determinate part of reality while the most perfect being embraces reality. And Kant was driven by his own reasoning to postulate the existence of God and the reality of immortality by the fact that pure reason does discover the moral law. If the Kantian system had been discovered outside of and away from Christian influences it would be truly a remarkable system ; but, when we find in it, a mighty effort to crush the principles revealed in the Christian system of thought into the mould of his transcendental idealism, we are repelled by it. Take the categorical imperative "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law," and put down beside it the rule, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so unto them"³ — is the first possible without the second? Pure reason unaided by religion never could have reached such an height. On the other hand Religion, grasping in its Ontological Idea a perfect Being and holding experience in an inseparable relation to that idea, prepared the way for reason.

Again the principle of *autonomy* is the very heart of Christian

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

² *Ibid.*, p. 358.

³ Matthew, 7 : 12.

ethics as expounded by Saint Paul. It is the very essence of the *metanoia*. Jew and Greek, Barbarian and Scythian alike, out of Christ, are in the bondage of Heteronomy. The law to them was a yoke of bondage. The law itself is good but it is always looked upon as imposed from without, and obedience, the empirical filling in of this good law, was discovered to be impossible. Faith, however, by accepting Christ and entering into union with Him also introduces the law as an autonomous principle. For one whose "life is hid with Christ in God"¹ the law of God or the perfect will of God is a part of his being. This change is so great that Paul ever described it as a resurrection from the dead.

Calvinistic Ethics.—The spontaneousness of the autonomous principle of life brings to our thought the dilemma of the scholastics. "Is the good good because God wills it or does God will it because it is good?"² If we adopt the first, we thereby deny the character of God; and if we accept the latter, we give up the supremacy of God. This dilemma is to be avoided by saying God is good and there is no goodness apart from Him. "There is none good but one that is God," and human goodness arises from union with him. Since this subject was discussed under the topic *metanoia* it is not needful to enlarge upon it in this place. There is, however, an important problem of ethics which has its solution in this conception of the union of the believer with God. It is everywhere apparent in what might be called *Calvinistic Ethics*. It is also prominent in the Kantian theory. It is tersely expressed in the saying: "He that is not with me is against me," or as Kant expressed it: "A man is either good or bad; he cannot be part bad and part good." These sayings seem to conflict with what we constantly observe. Good and bad do seem to be mixed in all human life. This seeming, however, disappears when we cease to judge human actions by their outward worth and fix our attention upon their inmost purpose. In the last analysis goodness or badness are determined by the relation which the soul sustains to God. This position the Calvinists describe as an inclina-

¹ Collossians, 3: 3.

² Lotze, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

tion or disposition of the will. In my theory it is rather that relation to God which makes the will of God autonomous in the believer. This is not to say that the relation to God which a *metanoia* discovers makes the character of the individual immediately perfect and complete. Virtue is still attained by an infinite progress. Nevertheless the helpful relation which the soul of the believer sustains to God makes the pathway to virtue easier.

Our agreement with Kant in regard to heteronomy and autonomy is thus substantial. In the preceding chapter we have already described the heteronomous theories as unable to stand alone. All systems which depend upon empiricism must fail to discover a universal law and all rational systems whether theistic or atheistic fail to give a dynamic and therefore "gender to bondage." It does not matter whether the norm of conduct is a will of God revealed by divine inspiration or a law of nature discovered by reason, the bondage is equally galling. The only true freedom is the freedom gained in the Christian sense of a union with the source of all goodness. At this point our departure from Kant is apparent and for a better way. Of what possible value can goodness be if the doer of the good act can have no motive but the act itself. On the other hand if a good action is done in a real world and springs from the actor's relation to that world, our conception of its value is enhanced.

The Idea of God, therefore, has served as a guide in criticising ethical theories and in discovering the true solution of the problem of ethics. It contributes the long-sought dynamic by discovering the purpose of the Ontological Idea. It leads to the true norm of conduct by revealing a perfect will embodied in a perfect life. And this process has been verified by the historical revelation of goodness to the world first in a nation, Israel, and then in an historic person, Jesus Christ.


CONCLUSION.

We have now traversed the way which the subject of our thesis indicated for us. That way was determined by the inner nature

of the theme. Two things have appeared prominently throughout the discussion. The first is that the Ontological argument either directly or by implication has served as a guiding principle in thought. It demands a theory of knowledge. The transition which Anselm made from the concept of a most perfect being to the God of religious experience requires a discovery of the relations subsisting between concept and being. The problem thus proposed has been discussed in every theory of knowledge worthy of mention. We have found in Idealism the only answer that meets the requirements of experience. Again the *a priori* nature of the argument gave thought an introspective turn and prepared the way for a science of psychology and a scientific psychology of religious experiences. And in the last place the concept of a most perfect being since it is a part of the sum total of experience could not fail to influence the moral character of man. Thus in these vital concerns of thought, experience and conduct the Ontological Proof of the existence of God has served as a valuable guiding principle. This I would call the first part of its practical content.

The other part is concerned more directly with its validity. In the analysis of Consciousness we found a condition, a relation between concept and emotion internally and between purpose and act externally which has to be applied to the Ontological concept. The idea of an Other is ever connected with the limitation of self. This idea is analyzed as experience furnishes it with a content. Its purpose holds together those experiences which stand the test of truth and value. Thus the Ontological Idea takes its place as a constructive force in the world. It dominates the religious life. It also gives the only true Dynamic to Ethics. I cannot conceive of an impersonal categorical imperative. And Lotze has well said : "A value appreciated by no one and consisting in pleasure and pain for no one is something which contradicts itself."¹ Religion, then, consisting of character, all that a man is in himself and in his relation to God, and conduct or all that a man does, is the other practical content of the Ontological Proof of the existence of God. "Si monumentum quaeris, circumspice."

¹ Lotze, "Philosophy of Religion," p. 157.



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